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TITLE VII & TITLE IX = ?:
IS TITLE IX THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY FOR
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN THE
EDUCATIONAL SECTOR?
INTRODUCTION
In 1964, President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of into law,
which contained a title providing for "EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY.' 1
The Act represented a comprehensive government reaction to employment
discrimination. On April 19, 1972, Congress passed extensive amendments
to the Act, broadening the reach to include state and local government
employers, establishments with eight or more employees, and educational
institutions? Barely two months later, Congress passed the Higher Education
Amendments of 1972.1 Title IX, which prohibited sexual discrimination in
any federally funded educational program, was included in this extensive
legislation. Although Title IX was not originally viewed as applying to
employment, Supreme Court decisions expanded Title IX to encompass
private rights of action to remedy employment discrimination.4 As a result,
Title IX soon became the source of employment discrimination litigation, and
Title IX and Title VII claims were consolidated in complaints against educa-
tion employers. Since the legal requirements and remedies of Title IX and
Title VII are remarkably similar, this association, appearing relatively
inconsequential under normal circumstances, may have significant implica-
tions in situations where plaintiffs raise both claims concurrently.
These situations arise when a claimant fails to fulfill the more
extensive administrative procedures of Title VII. When this happens, Title IX
benefits the plaintiff. Even though their Title VII action is precluded, judicial
interpretations of Title IX allow plaintiffs access to the courthouse, resulting
in pleas for the same damages available under Title VII. Although these
plaintiffs may no longer assert Title VII claims, they still have identical
opportunities for relief.
Whether plaintiffs in this situation have a right to circumvent Title
VII is increasingly the subject of litigation. As the overlap between Title VII
and Title IX comes under greater scrutiny, courts must define the parameters
of the overlap and decide whether or not to allow this type of circumvention.
'Civl Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, TitleVII, §§ 701-707, 78 Stat. 241,253-
266 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
2 Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
'Pub. L. No. 92-318, Title IX, § 901, 86 Stat. 373 (1972) (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. § 1681 (1994)).
4 North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
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Defendants arguing that Title VII preempts its educational compan-
ion face a difficult battle, because they are arguing for a proposition the
Supreme Court appears to have rejected in its cases interpreting Title IX.
However, a more thorough analysis of Title IX, Title VII and these Supreme
Court cases indicates that Title VII does indeed preempt Title IX.
This Note will examine the issues involved in the question of whether
Title VII preempts Title IX in employment discrimination claims. The
purpose of this note is to look past the facade created by a literal reading of
these Supreme Court cases to form a more accurate picture of the scope of
Title IX. Section One will provide a statutory description of Title VII and
Title ix. Section Two will examine the holdings of the Supreme Court cases
that have shaped Title IX into its modem form. Section Three will examine
the reasoning of two district court opinions which have interpreted these
Supreme Court cases but have arrived at contrary conclusions regarding the
preemption issue. This Section will conclude that the Supreme Court holdings
do not support a Title IX private right of action for employment discrimina-
tion.
Defendants arguing for preemption must present persuasive reasons
why Title VII should be the exclusive remedy for educational employees.
Accordingly, Section Four will examine the statutory construction and
legislative history of Title IX and will look at the arguments proponents of
preemption must present. This analysis will demonstrate that Congress
intended employment discrimination plaintiffs to plead for relief under Title
VII not through an invocation of the implied right of action under Title IX.
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I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF TITLE VII AND TITLE IX
A. TrrLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' represents Congress' most
comprehensive attempt at battling employment discrimination. Today, after
two major amendments, 6 Title VII is still the most potent legal weapon against
discrimination. It is the "weapon of choice" for plaintiffs. In three federal
districts, the number of Title VII cases filed in 1980-81 outnumbered actions
filed under sections 1981, 1982, 1985, 1986 of Title 28, the Equal Pay Act,
the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADEA.7 In fact, among all civil rights
statutes, the only statute generating more claims than Title VII was 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.8
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or
S 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Title VII provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
6 Substantial amendments were enacted in 1972 and 1991. See Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972); Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1971 (1991). Less significant changes were made to Title VII
in 1976, 1978, and 1980.
7 Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Importance of Section 1981, 73 CORNELL
L. REv. 596, 599 (1988).
1 The districts studied were the Central District of California, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, andthe Northern District of Georgia. 'Together, these three districts accounted
for 7.9% of all nonprisoner civl rights claims filed in fiscal 1980-81, and they include the major
cities of Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Atlanta." Id. at 598.
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national origin."9 The purpose of Title VII is equally concise to: "achieve
equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated
in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
employees."'"
To achieve these goals, Congress created the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to enforce Title VII." As a result of
legislative compromise, an effort to respect state sovereignty, and to encour-
age conciliatory outcomes, Congress created very specific administrative
requirements and time limitations concerning claims under the Act.'2
Exhaustion of these requirements is a prerequisite for any suit under Title
VII. 13 These administrative requirements complicate the operation and
interpretation of Title VII. The requirements differ depending on whether a
claim is being asserted in a state which has its own agency which enforces
fair employment laws or in a state which that lacks such an agency.
In a state without a state enforcement agency, plaintiffs must first file
a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the discriminatory act.' 4 The
EEOC then conducts an investigation to determine whether there is probable
cause that a violation has occurred.'" If probable cause exists, the EEOC
attempts to eliminate the violation through negotiation or mediation.' 6 The
EEOC has 180 days to attempt this informal resolution of the conflict.' 7 1f
after thirty days, the EEOC's methods do not produce satisfactory results, the
commission may file a complaint in federal court.'I This precludes private
actions against the employer. 19 If, after 180 days, informal methods still have
not resolved the conflict, the charging party may request a "right to sue" letter
from the EEOC allowing the party to initiate a private suit.20 Since the letter
is a prerequisite to filing a complaint, private action is barred until the EEOC
9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
0 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429-30 (1971).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
1
2See, e.g., Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980); Northwest Airlines, Inc.
v. Transport Workers Union of America, 451 U.S. 77, 98 (1981).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) & (f) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
1442 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
1'42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
16 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (the statute requires "conference,
conciliation, and persuasion.").
17 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(f) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
19 Id.
20 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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has had an opportunity to attempt to resolve the conflict.21 However, at any
time the EEOC may complete its investigation and issue a right to sue letter.
After receipt of the letter, a party has ninety days to file suit.22
The procedure for filing a Title VII claim is slightly different in states
that have agencies to enforce fair employment laws. In these states, a party
must file a charge with a local agency. The charge must be filed during the
time limits set by local law. These limits are not less than 180 days.23 If
timely, the claim is handled exclusively by the local agency for sixty days.24
If after sixty days there is no resolution, the party may file an action with the
EEOC. To preserve a claim, the party must file thirty days after termination
of the state proceedings, or within 300 days of the occurrence of the discrimi-
natory act, whichever is earlier.26 Once before the EEOC, the complaint is
subject to the same requirements as those applicable in a state that does not
have a local fair employment agency.
In 1991, Congress passed several amendments to the Civil Rights
Act.27 These amendments provided for compensatory and punitive damages
for victims of intentional employment discrimination.28 The amendments also
provided plaintiffs the option of a jury trial, and prohibited "mixed-motive"
discrimination.2 9
21Stebbins v. Continental Ins. Companies, 442 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Vinieratos v.
United States, 939 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1991).
2242 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
2142 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1981). If the party files first with the EEOC within the 180 day
deadline, the commission will refer the charge to the state agency. Id. This provision insures
that a claimant is not restricted to a shorter time limit than those filing directly with the EEOC.
Davis v. Valley Distributing Co., 522 F.2d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1090 (1977).
2442 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2 Id.
1Id. If the charge was originally filed with the EEOC, the commission will reactivate it
upon termination of the local proceedings and filing by the claimant.
27Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2m (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
29 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (1988 & Supp V 1993) (jury trial); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)
(1988 & Supp V 1993). Mixed motive discrimination occurs when the employer relies on both
illegitimate (i.e. discriminatory) criteria and legitimate criteria in making an employment
decision. See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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B. TITLE IX
Enacted as part of the Education Act Amendments of 1972,30 Title IX
was a response to Congress' growing concern about the problem of sex
discrimination in educational programs.3" Title IX was initially adopted as a
floor amendment and, as a result, is less complex and structured than Title
VII3 2 Title IX requires that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance. 33
The purposes of Title IX are twofold: Congress wanted both to
"avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices" and to
"provide individual citizens effective protection against those practices."34
To achieve these purposes, Congress required all departments and agencies
extending financial assistance to educational programs to create procedures
for terminating financial assistance to institutions violating Title IX. 31 The
administrative portion of Title IX prohibits a financial termination action until
the relevant agency or department has determined that compliance cannot "be
secured by voluntary means. 36 The statute also requires that termination
emanate only from an "express finding on the record, after opportunity for
hearing, or a failure to comply. '37 As a result, Title IX contains none of the
characteristics most commonly associated with Title VII such as references to
"conciliation," timetables, or requirements of deference to state agencies.
In the last 15 years, Title IX has changed considerably, predominantly
as a result of three Supreme Court decisions interpreting the statutory lan-
guage. These decisions recast Title IX in the images of Titles VI and VII.
Understanding these three cases is fundamental to understanding Title IX and
the issue of its preemption by Title VII. Therefore, the analysis must begin by
examining these cases.
3020 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1994).
3 See 118 CONG. REC. 5804-15 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 554, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3
(1972).
32North Haven Bd. ofEduc. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 523 n.13,524 (1982).
3 20 U.S.C. §1681(a) (1994).
34 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
1120 U.S.C. § 1682 (1994) (this is the only express remedy provided for in Title IX).
36 id.
37id.
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I[. INTERPRETATION OF TITLE IX BY THE SUPREME COURT
Litigation surrounding Title IX is more complex than the statutory
language might indicate. This is because the Supreme Court's interpretation
of Title IX in Cannon v. University of Chicago,38 North Haven Bd. of Educ.
v. Bell,39 and Franklin v. Gwinnett Co. Pub. Sch.4" In the thirteen year span
of these cases, the Court transformed Title IX into an effective weapon
against employment discrimination, even though Title IX contains neither
references to employment, nor remedies beyond termination of federal
funding. The Court accomplished this feat by constructing a private right of
action from the terms of Title IX with recoverable monetary damages. The
Court then applied those terms to the employment context. The case that
began this statutory reconstruction was Cannon v. University of Chicago.
A. CANNON V. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO41
The plaintiff in Cannon was denied admission to both the University
of Chicago Medical School and Northwestern University Medical School.42
She brought a civil rights suit under Section 901(a) of Title IX alleging sex
discrimination.43 Her complaint claimed a private right of action for damages
for sex discrimination that occurred during the admission selection process.44
The district45 and circuit courts" rejected this claim, but the Supreme Court
reversed the lower courts concluding that Title IX did contain a private right
of action.47
The Court based its analysis on the four factors for establishing an
implied right of action identified in Cort v. Ash.4 Cort involved a claim
arising under 18 U.S.C. § 610, which prohibits corporate contributions in
connection with federal elections. The plaintiff asserted an implied cause of
1 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
11456 U.S. 512 (1982).
41503 U.S. 60 (1992).
41441 U.S. 677 (1979).
42Id. at 681 n.2.
43 Id.
4Id.
45 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 406 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ill. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d
1063 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
MCannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 441 U.S. 677
(1979).
47 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
4 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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action from the statute. However, the Supreme Court held no such cause of
action existed.49 In its opinion, the Court identified four factors used to
determine whether an implied cause of action existed. First, courts must ask
whether the plaintiff is "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted."5  Second, the Court must inquire whether there is "any
indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a
remedy or to deny one?"51 Third, the Court must ask whether the implied
remedy is "consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme...,"2 Finally, the Court must inquire whether the remedy was better
left to state law. 3
In Cannon, the Court affir-matively answered the first factor.
Drawing an analogy to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,s4 the court noted
that the language differs from language which protects the general public.55
The Court then examined the legislative history of Title IX to determine
whether Congress had intended to create a private remedy, as required by the
second prong of the Cort analysis. 6 The Court focused on several references
made to Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act by Senator Bayh, the sponsor-
ing Senator of the Title IX amendment. 7 Based on these comments, the Court
concluded that Congress had fashioned Title IX after Title VI 8 The Court
assumed that Congress knew that the judiciary had found an implied right of
action under Title VI. As a result, the Court reasoned that Congress intended
the courts to recognize a similar right of action under Title IX.9
491d. at 85.
" Id. at 78 (citation omitted).
51 Id.
52 id.
5318.
42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
ss Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690.
16 Id. at 694.
s Id. at 694 n.16. The Court cited two additional statements by Senator Bayh: "The
same [enforcement] procedure that was set up and has operated with great success under the
1964 Civil Rights Act, and the regulations thereunder[,] would be equally applicable to
discrimination [prohibited by Title IX];" and "[E]nforcement of [Title IX] will draw heavily on
these precedents." Id. at 696 n.19 (alterations in original).
58 The Court noted that "[e]xcept for the substitution of the word 'sex' in Title IX to
replace the words 'race, color, or national origin' in Title VI, the statutes use identical language
to describe the benefited class." Id. at 694-95. One congresswoman contended that Title IX
was merely a "cut and paste job" using Title VI as a model. See North Haven Board of
Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,528 (1981) (citing Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education of the House Committee on Education
and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 409 (1975) (remarks of Rep. O'Hara).
" Cannon, 441 U.S. at 703.
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The Court also found that a private right of action would serve the
purposes of Title IX, as required under the third prong of the Cort analysis.
Although finding that federal funding termination might further the Act's first
purpose-eliminating federal support for discriminatory practices-the Court
concluded that the Act's second purpose--providing individuals with protec-
tion against those practices--could not be served by restricting relief to
federal funding termination.60 Positing that the government would rarely use
such a severe remedy, the majority noted that the statute provided only
marginal protection to individuals threatened by discrimination. It concluded
that an alternative remedy of individual relief was necessary for "orderly
enforcement of the statute. 61 Finally, the Court answered the fourth prong of
the Cort inquiry, whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to
the states, 62 in favor of federal law since, according to the Court, the federal
sector has been the primary protector of civil rights since the Civil War.63
B. NORTH HAVEN BOARD OF EDUCATION V. BELL
64
Until 1981, it was unclear whether Title IX applied to employment
practices. Not only were the Circuit courts split on the question, but federal
agencies were also in conflict.
65
The petitioners in North Haven were atypical for Title IX
cases--both petitioners were public school boards. Public school boards are
more frequently involved in employment discrimination claims as defendants,
rather than as plaintiffs. The petitioners challenged the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare's authority (hereinafter HEW) to issue regulations
6Id. at 705.
1, Id. at 704-06.
62 Id. at 708-09.
61Id. at 708.
"456 U.S. 512 (1982).
65 Four Circuit Courts held that Title IX did not apply to employment practices. See
Seattle Univ. v. Department of Health, Ed. & Welfare, 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1980), vacated
456 U.S. 986 (1982) (remanding for further consideration in light of North Haven); Romeo
Community Sch. v. Department of Health, Ed. & Welfare, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied sub nom Harris v. Romeo Community Sch., 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Junior College Dist.
of St. Louis v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom Harris v. Junior
College of St Louis, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Islesbow Sch. Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1 st
Cir. 1979), cert deniedsub nom Harris v. Islesboro School Comm., 444 U.S. 972 (1979). The
Fifth Circuit ruled that employment practices were within the Title's scope. See Dougherty Cty.
Sch. Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980).
For examples of federal agency conflict, see North Haven, 456 U.S. at 516, 517 n.6, 520
n.9. See also 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.51-106.61 (1980); 7 C.F.R. §§ 15a.51-15a.61 (1980); 13
C.F.R. §113.3 (1981).
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regarding employment discrimination.66 HEW had investigated both petition-
ers for violation of Title IX regulations stemming from employees' complaints
about gender discrimination. Both school districts filed suit in federal district
court when HEW threatened them with corrective action.
On appeal, the Second Circuit consolidated the cases and concluded,
based on Title IX's legislative history, that the statute applied to employment
discrimination as well as to the more common circumstances of student
admissions and faculty advancement.67 The Supreme Court affirmed. 68
The majority opinion began by examining the language of Title IX.
Concluding that the language of the statute "neither expressly nor impliedly
excludes employees from its reach," the Court held (consistent with the
construction of other civil rights acts), Title IX should be interpreted
broadly.69 However, because the statutory language was not determinative,
the Court searched the legislative history of Title IX for evidence of Congres-
sional intent.7"
The Court based its reading of Title IX on two aspects of the provi-
sion's legislative history: statements made at the time of Title IX's enact-
ment,7 ' and the post-enactment history of enforcement.72 In reviewing the
history of the Senate bill, the Court relied exclusively on floor comments
made by Senator Birch Bayh. 73 Although recognizing that floor amendments
are a weak foundation for judicial interpretation, the Court noted that since the
Senator's statements were "the only authoritative indications of congressional
intent regarding the scope of [Title IX]," they should guide the statute's
interpretation.74 The Court reasoned that the Senator's comments indicated
his intent that Congress should include employment practices in Title IX.
In reviewing the Act's legislative history in the House, the Court's
analysis concentrated on a provision in the House bill which expressly
excluded employment practices from protection.7" The Senate bill contained
no corresponding provision and, as the Court noted, the section was later
eliminated during reconciliation of the House and Senate versions. This
66North Haven, 456 U.S. at 517.
67North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 785 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd sub
nom North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
68 North Haven, 456 U.S. at 540.
69 Id. at 521.
70 Id. at 522.
71 Id. at 523-30.
7' Id. at 530-35.
73 Id. at 524-26.
74 Id. at 527.
75id.
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elimination, coupled with Senator Bayh's statements, convinced the Court that
when Congress promulgated Title IX, it intended to prohibit employment
related discrimination as well as discrimination related to admissions, senior-
ity, and scholarships.76
The Court noted that the "postenactment history of Title IX provides
additional evidence of the intended scope of the Title and confirms Congress'
desire to ban employment discrimination in federally financed education
programs."" For example, the Court noted that Congress, in reviewing
-EW's regulations four years after the enactment of Title IX, rejected a
resolution objecting to HEW's application of Title IX to the employment
arena.7" The Court concluded that the legislative history "indicate[d] that
Congress was made aware of the Department's interpretation of the Act and
... lends weight to the argument that coverage of employment discrimination
was intended."79
C. FRANKLIN V. GWINETr COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS
80
In deciding Cannon, the Supreme Court did not specify the remedies
available for plaintiffs who successfuly asserted the newly recognized cause
of action. Instead, the Court left a void for the lower courts to fill. While one
circuit did suggest the school district should consider the possibility of
compensatory damages to private litigants," others refused to do so, 2 limiting
damages to only declaratory and injunctive relief.8 3 The Supreme Court
resolved these conflicting remedies in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools. 4
76Id. at 528.
7 1 d. at 530-31.
7 I1d. at 534-35.
79Id. at 534.
0 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
8' See Pfeiffer v. Marion Center Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990).
' The Seventh Circuit refused to award damages in Lieberman v. University of Chicago,
660 F.2d 1185, 1186-88 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 937 (1982). The Circuit Court
inFranklin also held that compensatory damages were unavailable under Title IX. Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools, 911 F.2d 617, 622 (1lth Cir. 1990), rev'd, 503 U.S. 60
(1992). See also Eastman v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State Univ., 939 F.2d 204 (4th
Cir. 1991). But cf Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 884 n.3 (lst Cir. 1988)
(inconclusive).
I The reasoning of the four circuits, supra note 82, comes from Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1980). In Pennhurst, the Supreme Court decided that where
Congress enacts or has enacted spending clause legislation, the proper remedy is to stop
payment of federal funds to the offending entity. Id. at 28.
14 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
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The petitioner in Franklin was a former student at North Gwinnett
High School.85 She alleged that a teacher had made sexual advances towards
her and forced her to engage in sexual intercourse. 6 Although school admin-
istrators were allegedly aware of the teacher's actions, the petitioner claimed
they made no attempt to discourage the teacher's advances.87 The school
initiated an investigation, but closed its inquiry when the teacher resigned
after the petitioner filed her complaint.88 The petitioner sought damages under
Title IX for intentional gender-based discrimination.89
To determine whether damages are available under Title IX, the Court
reexamined the state of the law at the time the legislature passed Title D0
As in Cannon, the Court assumed that Congress knew of the Court's treat-
ment of similar laws at the time of the enactment, and assumed Congress
enacted Title IX with these treatments in mind. In ruling, the Court presumed
Congress' familiarity with the Judicial Branch's broad power to provide any
and all necessary remedial relief for violations of statutorily created rights.9'
The Court concluded that unless the legislature indicated an intention to
abandon this premise, then "Congress enacted this statute with the prevailing
traditional rule in mind."92
As in North Haven, the Court also considered the post-enactment
history of the statute. The Court focused on two amendments to Title IX, the
Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Amendment of 198613 and the Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1987.14 Both amendments afforded Congress the
opportunity to restrict the right of action recognized in Cannon. Instead of
placing explicit restrictions on the damages available under Title IX, however,
85Id. at 63.
86Id. at 63-64.
8 Id. at 64.
88 Id.
89Id. at 60.
90Id. at 71-73.
91 Id. at 72-73.
92 Id. The Court arrived at this conclusion although the legislature had remained
completely silent on the issue of remedies. Id. at 71. The Court sidestepped the issue of
Congressional silence by arguing that Congress could not be expected to mention applicable
remedies for an action implied by the Court five years after enactment. The majority reasoned
that if Congress legislated under the awareness of the traditional presumption, its silence only
demonstrated that it assumed the courts would provide any appropriate remedies that were later
found necessary. Id. at 71-72.
1 Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Amendment of 1986, Pub.L. 99-506 § 1003, 100
Stat 1845 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
94 Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
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Congress remained silent. The Court viewed this silence as an indication that
Congress accepted the courts' power to provide appropriate remedies. 95
Based on this history, the Court unanimously concluded that damages
are available for an action brought under Title IX.96 Justice Scalia, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, concurred in the opinion. Scalia,
however, characterized the holding as standing for the paradoxical proposition
that "[u]nless Congress expressly legislates a more limited remedial policy
with respect to rights of action it does not know it is creating, it intends the
full gamut of remedies to be applied." 97 Justice Scalia suggested that courts
should have the power to limit the remedies available for an action con-
structed by the judiciary rather than expressly created by Congress.9" Never-
theless, he stated that in light of subsequent legislation, "it is too late in the
day to address whether a judicially implied exclusion of damages under Title
IX would be appropriate."99
Ill. APPLICATION OF THE SUPREME COURT CASES AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR LITIGANTS
Franklin completed the thirteen year evolution of Title IX. By 1992,
Title IX was transformed from a generally worded prohibition against sex
discrimination in education-with questionable practical effectiveness--into
a forceful tool for attacking sexual discrimination in educational institutions,
including sex discrimination in employment. The Supreme Court had
gradually reformed Title IX in the image of Title VII. After Franklin, the two
had become, in terms of legal requirements and remedies, virtually the same.
In fact, several courts subsequently found that the substantive standards of
both acts were so similar that issue preclusion prevented assertion of a Title
VII claim when a plaintiff had previously lost on the substantive issues of a
Title IX claim.1"'
The similarities, however, did not stretch to Title VIl's administrative
procedures. Unlike Title VII plaintiffs, plaintiffs who file a Title IX claim are
not required to attempt to resolve their grievances through conciliation or
negotiation. Likewise, Title IX plaintiffs are not subject to any filing dead-
95 Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 72 (1992).
96 d. at 76, 78.
97 Id. at 77.
98 Id.
99Id. at 78.
° See, ag., Mabry v. The State Board of Community Colleges and Occupational Educ.,
813 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987); O'Connor v. Peru State
College, 781 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1986); Nagel v. Avon Bd. of Educ., 575 F. Supp. 105 (D.
Conn. 1983).
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lines, nor are they subject to mandatory deferment to state agencies. These
administrative differences give Title IX plaintiffs an obvious advantage. Title
IX essentially creates a quicker and easier route to the courthouse for claim-
ants suing an educational institution for employment discrimination. A
plaintiff filing both a Title IX and a Title VII action has the opportunity to
recover even though she failed to meet EEOC deadlines, refused to allow
conciliation procedures to run their course, or did not receive a right to sue
letter from the EEOC. By filing only a Title IX suit, a plaintiff employed by
an institution covered by Title IX could avoid the carefully constructed Title
VII framework in its entirety. Thus, Title IX allows the plaintiff to wholly
circumvent Title VII.
Few courts have confronted this problem. These courts disagree
about its resolution. This discrepancy results from differing interpretations of
the trio of Supreme Court holdings that expanded Title IX. Because the
Supreme Court has not directly confronted the issue of whether Title IX
supports an implied cause of action for employment discrimination, the
outcome of Title VII and Title IX cases depend largely on the conclusions
lower courts derive from the three Supreme Court decisions.
The two district court cases discussed in the following sections
illustrate the differing degree of significance courts place on Cannon, North
Haven, and Franklin. The first opinion concludes that the three decisions
leave open the question of preemption of Title IX by Title VI, while the
second holds that these decisions foreclose the preemption question.
A. STOREY V. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN 011
In Storey I and Storey JJ,12 the federal district court for the Western
District of Wisconsin considered whether Congress intended Title VII to
preempt remedies other than those existing prior to Title VII's enactment.1
03
The plaintiff, an assistant professor at the University of Wisconsin, brought
suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Title IX, alleging that the Univer-
sity's denial of her appointment to full professor constituted discrimination
'
01 Storey v. Board of Regents of the Univ. Of Wisconsin, 600 F. Supp. 838 (W.D. Wis.
1985) (hereinafter Storey 1). The district court reserved judgement on defendants' motion to
dismiss under Title IX. Id. at 842. The viability of plaintiffs Title IX claim was adjudicated in
Storey v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin, 604 F. Supp. 1200 (W.D. Wis. 1985)
(hereinafter Storey I).
112 Storey 1, 600 F. Supp. at 839; Storey 11, 604 F. Supp. at 1201.
" See Storey, 600 F. Supp. 838, 842 (W.D. Wis. 1985). This opinion discussed but did
not decide the defendant's motion to dismiss the Title IX cause of action. The court reached
that issue in Storey Il. See also Wedding v. Univ. of Toledo, 862 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ohio
1994) (holding that Title VII preempts Title IX).
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due to her gender."' The University's Board of Regents moved to dismiss the
§ 1983 and Title IX claims."0 5
With respect to plaintiff's § 1983 claim, the court attempted to
ascertain from the legislative history of Title VII whether Congress intended
to preempt other conflicting legislation."'" The court divined an intent to
"leave untouched pre-existing avenues of relief."' °7 The Storey court con-
cluded that this intention allowed the plaintiff to assert a claim under § 1983,
because the statute was enacted before Title VII.1e° However, the opinion
noted that the plaintiff's Title IX claim presented an entirely different issue. 109
Unlike Title ViI's legislative history, the court found nothing in the
legislative history of Title IX indicating that Congress designed it to provide
remedies "in addition" to pre-existing avenues of relief.' The opinion noted
that there was no indication that Congress intended to have Title IX depart
from Congress' earlier instructions that in enacting Title VII it desired "to
leave intact only preexisting alternative remedies, not to permit future
overlapping avenues of relief."' " The court reasoned that Congress' specific
preservation of pre-existing remedies indicated a conscious decision to allow
Title VII to act as the exclusive remedy for violations of overlapping
post-Title VII statutes.
The Storey analysis also focused on the similarities between the
remedies available under Title VII and Title IX. The court observed that in
cases which had accorded a private right of action under Title IX, the plaintiff
"typically had not had recourse to a remedial statutory scheme like Title
VII. '""2 The court argued that where a plaintiff asserts both a Title IX and a
Title VII claim:
Plaintiff is not remediless. She is fully capable of pursuing
her claim under Title VII, not to mention § 1983 .... Of
course, following enactment of Title VII, Congress has been
free to provide victims of employment-related discrimination
"'4Storey 1, 600 F. Supp. at 839.
"
5 Id. See supra note 103.
"6Id. at 840.
"
07Id. at 840-41 ("[I]t appears Congress intended to retain only those statutory remedies
already in existence when Title VII was enacted." (emphasis added)).
o'Id. at 841.
"'Id. at 842.
1101d.
"'Id. (emphasis added).
"Storeyl, 604 F. Supp. at 1201 (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. 677 (1979)); Lieberman v.
University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 937 (1982); De
La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979).
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with additional remedies. It has been free to do so expressly.
It has been free to do so by implication, but against the
background of Title VII, its intention to do so requires a
powerful implication on its part.
1 13
The court concluded that, unlike in Cannon, there was insufficient evidence of
Congressional intent to imply a remedy for employment-related discrimina-
tion1
14
The Storey opinion distinguished Cannon, noting that the Cannon
majority had relied upon the absence of a private remedy for individual
victims of discrimination. The Storey plaintiff, however, was capable of
pursuing her claim under Title VII. 5 As a result, the plaintiff was not left
remediless and was protected from discrimination-which satisfied the
primary purpose of the Act."6 The court then dismissed the plaintiff's Title
IX claim.
B. HENSCHKE V. NEW YORK HOSPITAL-CORNELL MEDICAL CENTER' 17
In a recent decision, the Southern District of New York has explicitly
rejected the Storey analysis, concluding that Title VII does not preempt Title
IX."8 The plaintiff, a professor of radiology, alleged that she was passed over
for appointment to Acting Chief of her department because of gender-based
discrimination. She filed actions under Title IX and VII."l 9
Defendants moved to dismiss the Title VII cause of action because
the plaintiff had not fulfilled the statute's procedural requirements. They also
moved to dismiss the Title IX cause of action asserting that Title VII pre-
empted Title IX.12 ' The court granted the first motion"'2 and denied the
second, relying in large part on its readings of Cannon, North Haven and
Franklin." In a brief discussion, the court held that when the opinions were
read together they stood for the proposition that Title IX was intended to
"
3 Storey I, 604 F. Supp. at 1205.
1141d.
15 id.
116 id.
"7 821 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
... Id. at 172. See also Bowers v. Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp. 142 (W.D. Tex. 1994)
(cause of action under Title IX).
"rIid. at 168.
120 id.
121Id. at 170-71.
'id. at 171-73.
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"serve as an additional protection against gender-based discrimination in
educational programs receiving federal funding regardless of the availability
of a remedy under Title VI... ."123
The Henschke court's interpretation of Title IX is flawed by its
incorrect extrapolation from the Supreme Court opinions.124 Fundamentally,
neither Cannon, North Haven nor Franklin held that a private cause of action
arises in an employment related claim where Title VII is also asserted. In
fact, none of the claims considered in the three Supreme Court cases were
brought by employees. The Cannon and Franklin plaintiffs were students
seeking admission to educational institutions, while the North Haven suit was
brought by two federally funded public school boards contesting the validity
of Title IX's express remedy. The Henschke court ignored these distinctions
when evaluating the three cases. It is thus unsurprising that the court quotes
neither word nor rationale of these decisions in support of its holding.
Instead, Henschke relies only on North Haven's "extensive analysis of the
legislative history of Title IX" and lack of:
suggestion in either the Supreme Court opinion or the Sec-
ond Circuit opinion in North Haven that the scope of Title
IX's protection against employment discrimination would
not extend to an action by an individual who is also seeking
relief under Title VII. 25
i2 Id. at 172.
£2 See, e.g,. id.:
There is no suggestion in either the Supreme
Court opinion or the Second Circuit opinion
in North Haven that the scope of Title IX's
protection against employment discrimination
would not extend to an action by an
individual who is seeking relief under Title
VII .... Reading all of the above together
[Cannon, North Haven and Franklin], it is
the opinion of this court that the legislative
history of Title IX demonstrates an intent on
the part of Congress to have Title IX serve as
an additional protection.
The District Court inBowers v. Baylor Univ. used similar reasoning. Although agreeing
with the defendant's analysis, the court stated that the Supreme Court's decisions "lead this
Court to the conclusion that the Supreme Court would take the next logical step of recognizing
Bowers' cause of action under Title IX." Bowers v. Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp. 142, 145
(W.D. Tex. 1994).
2
' Henschke, 821 F. Supp at 172.
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However, because the North Haven Court was concerned only with
the express portions of the act, the Court had no reason to consider whether
Cannon's implied right of action covered employment. As a result, the lack
of suggestion in the Cannon opinion that Title IX did not apply to employ-
ment discrimination was neither surprising or dispositive. In his dissent,
Justice Powell referred to the tension between Title IX and Title VII, but only
as one indication that Congress did not intend Title IX to cover employment
practices. 26 So although the Court rejected Justice Powell's view of Con-
gress' intent; there is no indication that it specifically rejected his more
specific remedy for employment discrimination. 127
Moreover, the district court in Henschke focused on the wrong case.
Cannon best answers the question of whether Title IX supports an action for
employment discrimination, not North Haven.2 ' The Cannon majority's
silence on whether the issue of an implied action for employment discrimina-
tion exists is even less surprising than the absence of such a discussion in
North Haven. When the Cannon court considered the question of whether an
implied private cause of action existed under Title IX the Court had yet to
hold that Title IX covered employment practices. Thus, the majority had no
more reason to consider the issue than did the North Haven majority.
Even when read together, as the Henschke opinion encourages, the
three cases do not provide an answer to the Title IX/Title VII question. The
Supreme Court cases on which Henschke relies are not as conclusive on the
issue as that opinion intimates. The North Haven and Cannon decisions were
predominately based on findings of legislative intent. To the extent that
legislative history is the primary source for determining whether an implied
26 North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 551-55 (1981).
'
27Id. at 535 n.26.
" The challenge is not to determine if the North Haven holding applies to the implied
right of action found in Cannon, but to decide if an implied right of action for employment
discrimination existed at all. As Justice Scalia pointed out, the search for Congress' remedial
intent for a private cause of action is unlikely to succeed, since Congress never created it-the
Court merely implied it. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Soh., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992)
(Scalia, J. concurring). The search for the scope of that right would encounter similar
difficulties. Congress is unlikely to discuss the scope of a cause of action it did not realize it was
creating. In contrast, it is more likely that where Congress indicated an intent to create a cause
of action, it would have indicated whether this new cause of action should apply to employment
discrimination.. Consistent with this analysis, the North Haven Court did not restrict its
reasoning to the specific circumstances of the case before it, but spoke in broad, general terms
about the scope of the Title as a whole. Cannon left room to identify specific areas that are not
necessarily subject to that holding. This is because, unlike the North Haven analysis (which was
simple legislative interpretation), the Cannon opinion drew on inferences from "contextual"
evidence of legislative intent. If the contextual evidence is different for different subject areas
of the Title, it would also indicate whether an implied action exists might also be different. In
this respect, Justice Powell's dissent is misplaced; he should have made the dissent thirteen
years earlier in Cannon, rather than in North Haven.
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action exists, the Supreme Court, even while reading the cases together, has
yet to make the requisite analysis of Title IX legislative history regarding
employment history. 29 The Henschke court did not recognize this failure.
Instead, it was content to piece together dicta from various opinions to draw
its final conclusion. However, the issue of whether an implied right of action
for employment discrimination exists cannot be dealt with through inferences
from dicta. Since both Cannon and North Haven were based on inferences
of legislative intent, adding their holdings together to infer a separate proposi-
tion compounds inference upon inference. There is no assurance that this
level of abstraction accurately reflects congressional intent.
The substantive right found in Cannon is "one that Congress did not
expressly create, but that [the] Court found to be implied."' 10 Since Congress
did not create it, there is no way to determine what Congress would have
intended the courts do. Hence, the search for Congressional intent as to scope
of the remedial right is "unlikely to succeed."'' Courts should base future
holdings in this arena on an analysis that does not rely on Congressional
intent. Otherwise, employment discrimination may not be covered by the
language of Cannon and North Haven, leaving victims of employment
discrimination without a private right of action.
At first glance, this proposition-that employment discrimination
presents an exception to Cannon's holding'----may seem curious. The
implication is that an implied right of action exists for some plaintiffs, but not
others, even though both groups are within the title's scope. This implication
may not be as anomalous as it seems. In prior cases, the Supreme Court has
found an implied cause of action under one provision of a statute while
finding no implied cause of action under a separate provision of the same
statute. For instance, in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis,'33 the
Court concluded that in enacting the Investment Advisor's Act of 1940,114
Congress intended to create a cause of action in one section but not in another
section of the Act.3 Similarly, with respect to Title IX, Congress may have
intended non-employees to possess a right of action against federally funded
12 See Wedding v. University of Toledo, 862 F. Supp. 201 (N.D.Ohio 1994) ("This Court
does not, however, find these cases [Cannon and North Haven] dispositive of the Inatter....
[E]ven when read in conjunction with Cannon, it does not necessarily follow... that a private
cause of action must also exist for employees." Id. at 202-03.).
1 Frandin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 76 (Scalia, J., concurring).
131 d.
I Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (Cort v. Ash test supported a
private cause of action in favor of discrimination victims).
33 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
114 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (1989).
135Transamerica Mortgage Advisors Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18-24 (1979).
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educational institutions, while intending that employees be restricted to relief
through Title VII. Alternatively, Congress may not have considered the issue
at all, placing relief with the courts' discretion.
In either case, the challenge for courts confronting simultaneous Title
IX and Title VII actions is to determine whether Title IX supports an implied
cause of action specifically for employment discrimination. Ten years ago,
the law required courts to simply apply the test of Cort v. Ash to Title IX, as
the Supreme Court did in Cannon.'36 Today, however, the Supreme Court
applies Cort v. Ash in name only, if at all. In its place, courts engage in a
much less formulaic inquiry that is more consistent with a modest view of the
judiciary's purpose.'37 This more restrained approach is premised on the
belief that the Court's tasks are the same whether deciding the existence of an
implied cause of action or an express cause of action. 38 In both instances, the
Court defers to the authority of Congress to enact laws and focuses on
divining the Congressional intent.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT ANALYSIS AND THE
INTERACTIONS OF TITLE VII AND TITLE IX.
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTENT ANALYSIS
The Court's treatment of implied causes of action has gone through
several doctrinal periods.'39 Cort v. Ash represents a transition between the
two most recent periods. The Cort decision shifted away from using legisla-
tive purpose as the determining factor for establishing implied actions, 4 in
favor of using Congressional intent.
Although Cort's clear and comprehensive format was generally
accepted for four years, dissatisfaction grew over its split in emphasis
between legislative purpose and intent and it was gradually redefined out of
'3 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688-709 (1979).
'
37 See generally H. Miles Foy III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and
Implied Private Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CoRNELL L. REV. 501, 565-84
(1986) (hereinafter Foy). The history of implied actions is long and stretches through several
different doctrinal periods. The first implied action case was Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I
Cranch) 137 (1803). Before Justice Marshall struck down the Judiciary Act as contrary to the
Constitution, the Court held that Marbury was entitled to relief by implication of law, although
no remedy had been expressly provided for by Congress in the 1801 Act. Id. at 166.
131 Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 15.
' See generally John Haried, Note, implied Causes ofAction: A Product of Statutory
Construction or the Federal Common Law Power?, 51 U. COLO. L. REv. 355 (1980)
(hereinafter HARIED).
140 See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. Of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556 (1969); Securities
Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412,419 (1975).
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existence.141  Cannon v. University of Chicago marked the outermost
expansion of the Cort period. Prior to Cannon, the Court reaffirmed the Cort
analysis in several decisions. However, by 1979, there were signs that
members of the Court were dissatisfied with the Cort scheme.'42 The Cannon
Court rigidly applied the Cort analysis to the facts in Cannon. This rigid
application may have been the immediate reason for the test's demise. The
advantage of the Cort calculus was that it was straightforward and mechani-
cal. Lower courts found it easy to follow the Supreme Court's lead, and
liberally recognized new implied actions. Between 1975 and 1979, lower
courts found implied causes of action in twenty cases. 43 The Court over-
turned seven of these cases, 144 retreating from the more expansive approach.
The Supreme Court's treatment of implied causes of action reflects
its evolution to a more restrictive view of its role in relation to the legislature.
The Court's use of congressional intent was part of the evolution. However,
at the time the Supreme Court decided Cort v. Ash, its analysis of implied
action questions still reflected its earlier, more expansive purpose approach to
recognizing implied actions. Though the four part Cort test contained a
congressional intent requirement, the other three prongs related to statutory
purpose and the general desirability of implying a private right of action. 45
These criteria were inconsistent with the policy of Congressional intent, which
.
4 Seesupra notes 48-53 and accompanying text. While the Court applied the four Cort
factors equally in Cannon, less than a year later the Court noted that each of the factors were'
not entitled to equal weight. Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979).
The Touche Ross Court emphasized the legislative intent element of the test. Id. at 576.
Subsequent cases were less anchored to the Cort analysis, until Justice Scalia observed in
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1987) that the Court's use of the four factor Cort test
was a hollow formality and that the Court had all but expressly overruled Cort. Thompson, 484
U.S. at 189 (Scalia, J., concurring).
42 See Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (no cause of action for
fiaud in aparent-subsidialy merger under Rule lob-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934);
Piper v. Chris Craft Industries, 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (implied cause of action for damages under
§ 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was unnecessary to achieve the statute's
purpose).
Numerous lower courts applied Cort rigidly. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Regional Transportation
Authority, 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977) (independent cause of action in the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973); Clark v. Gulf Oil Co., 570 F.2d 1138 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 970
(1978) (no private right of action for relief under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717); and
McDaniel v. Univ. Of Chicago, 548 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1038
(1978) (rejecting claim that 40 U.S.C. § 276a-2(b) gives laborers and mechanics a private right
of action).
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 676, 741-42 (1979).
'4HARIED, supra note 139, at 370.
141 See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 740 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) ("Of the four factors mentioned in Cort, only one refers expressly to legislative
intent. The other three invite independent judicial lawmaking.").
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is premised on the belief that providing a private cause of action is a legisla-
tive, not a judicial responsibility. 116 The mixture of varying doctrinal founda-
tions for the Cort factors ultimately doomed the approach.
The harbinger of Cort's death came in the 1978 case, Davis v.
Passman 47 In Davis, the Supreme Court found that a cause of action existed
for redressing violations of a claimant's Fifth Amendment rights. In dictum,
the Court described the requisite inquiry for finding causes of action within
statutes: "[S]tatutory rights and obligations are established by Congress, and
it is entirely appropriate for Congress, in creating these rights and obligations,
to determine in addition who may enforce them in what manner .... In each
case, however, the question is the nature of the legislative intent informing a
specific statute .... ,148
Three justices expressed similar views in Cannon (Justice Powell in
dissent and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White in concurrences). They
argued that without proof of contrary intent, to imply a cause of action was
inappropriate regardless of the purpose of the statute in question. In their
view, federal courts' actions were limited by their statutory function of
divining and effectuating the intent of Congress.149
The seed planted by Powell's dissent grew in the Court's opinions in
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington50 and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors
Inc. v. Lewis.' Both opinions stated that the sole test for detenmining
implied causes of action was whether Congressional intent existed for such
actions.152 The practical effect of this was to circumscribe the Cort analysis
and to dispose of inquiry into purpose as an analytical tool.
In Touche Ross, the Court rejected a plaintiff's claim under § 17a of
the Securities Act of 193453 The plaintiff, a trustee of an insolvent securities
firm, claimed that because the defendant had erred in auditing and certifying
the firm's reports, the firm's customers had suffered additional losses. He
sought an action for damages and rescission of the investment contract.
In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court denied the plaintiff
relief under § 17a. When the Court questioned the validity of implied causes
of actions, it used a different tone than in prior decisions. For instance,
Justice Rehnquist made only a single reference to the four Cort factors,
'Id. at 739-40 (Powell, J., dissenting).
141 442 U.S. 228 (1978).
141Id. at 241.
149 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 710 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); id. at 728 (White, J.,
concurring); id. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting).
15 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
151 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
152 See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575; Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 17.
"3 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1989).
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despite the district court's reliance on these factors to decide the case.154
Instead, the opinion flatly asserted that the Court's task was simply to
determine "whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by
implication, a private cause of action."' 55 Consistent with this emphasis on
congressional intent, Justice Rehnquist construed the Cort test as merely a
guide for divining congressional intent."i 6 Likewise, he applied the holdings
of Cannon and J.L Case Co. v. Borak,157 a case decided largely on the basis
of statutory purpose, using reasoning similar to Cort.15s
In these respects, Touche indicated a change in direction for the
Court; the Court announced a much stricter interpretation of the Cort ap-
proach. Congressional "purpose" was no longer a consideration in determin-
ing the definitive issue-whether the requisite degree of Congressional will
existed so as to assume an implied cause of action. As Justice Rehnquist
stated: "[t]he ultimate question is one of Congressional intent, not one of
whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that
Congress enacted into law."' 59 The Court was no longer searching for implied
actions in law, but instead searched for unexpressed causes of action implied
by legislative facts. 160
The Transamerica opinion supported the Court's evolution to a strict
intent-based rule.'6' The plaintiff in Transamerica sought to pursue an action
under the Investment Adviser's Act of 1940. The Supreme Court refused to
imply such an action, concluding that the Act's provisions indicated a lack of
congressional intent for the judiciary to create any additional remedies beyond
those expressly provided. The Court observed, however that the lack of an
express private right was not determinative, and that it would look to "the
language or structure of the statute, or in the circumstances of its enact-
"I Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575.
1551d.
"' Id. at 575-76 (The four Cort factors are not "entitled to equal weight," and the
language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its purpose are all used to determine
legislative intent.).
117 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (finding a private right of action in § 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, because "it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies
as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose." Id. at 433.).
' See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 703 (reaching different conclusion as to Congressional intent,
though using same method). The Cannon court cited Borak five times. See id. at 689 n.9, 690-
92 n.13, 703-04 n.35, 706-07 n.41,711. The latter reference was used in the text of the
opinion to refute the respondent's argument that the express enforcement mechanisms of Title
IX indicated a lack ofcongressional intent to create a private right of action. See infra note 185.
" 
9 Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979).
60 See FoY, supra note 137, at 565.
"'Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
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ment." 162 Nonetheless, the Court argued that Congress knew how to provide
private remedies, and refused to imply a cause of action based on the compre-
hensive statutory remedies.' In general, the "presumption that a remedy was
deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a
comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of proce-
dures for enforcement."' 64 A plaintiff needed to demonstrate "persuasive
evidence of a contrary legislative intent" to rebut this presumption. 6 ' In
addition, although the Court recognized that the Act had a purpose of protect-
ing "clients of investment advisers," it deemed the issue of a private cause of
action to be "a different question."'66 Even in the face of a legislative history
"entirely silent" on the matter of private litigation under the act, the Court was
unwilling to overcome the presumption against implication by analyzing the
purpose of the statute.'67 The Court was reluctant to exert judicial power to
compensate for Congress' neglect in specifying the limits of its statutory
power. This created a difficult burden for future claimants wishing to
introduce implied causes of action.
Powell's concurrence culminated the evolution of the implied cause
of action analysis. He simply stated that he viewed the majority's opinion as
"compatible with [his] dissent in Cannon v. University of Chicago..."1"
This opinion clearly marks the Court's shift away from the multi factored
Cort test used in Cannon (using purpose analysis and implied private rights
of action) and towards a test based purely on Congressional intent. As Justice
Scalia later observed:
It could not be plainer that we effectively overruled the Cort
v. Ash analysis in Touche, Ross & Co. v. Reddington, and
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, converting
one of its four factors (congressional intent) into the deter-
162 1d. at 18.
163 Id. at 19-20.
'"Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1980).
165 Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 21 (1979); see also Karahalios v. National Federation of
Federal Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 532-33, 536 (1989) ("The ultimate issue is
whether Congress intended to create a private cause of action. Unless such congressional intent
can be inferred from the language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some other source,
the essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply does not exist" (citations
omitted) (internal quotations omitted)) But see Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (legislation silent on the question of private remedies evinces an
intent to preserve private actions, where such actions had already been recognized by the courts
at the time of enactment.)
166 Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 17-18.
167 Id. at 18.
'61 Id. at 25.
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minativefactor, with the other three merely indicative of its
presence or absence.... [T]his Court has long since aban-
doned its hospitable attitude towards implied rights of
action. ... The recent history of our holdings is one of
repeated rejection of claims of an implied right. 119
B. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT ANALYSIS AS APPLIED TO TITLE IX
Though the Supreme Court's modem implied action analysis indi-
cates the Cannon reasoning is now out of fashion, the Court's change in
approach since Cannon does not suggest that the opinion is defunct, or even
that the Court would overturn its decision given the opportunity. Rather, the
significance of the Court's change in philosophy is an indication of the
methods the lower courts should use to determine whether Title VII preempts
Title IX. As noted above, the existence of an implied private action for
employment discrimination is still an open question. At most, the Cannon
Court concluded only that there existed a general private cause of action
under Title IX. It did not consider the specific issue of a cause of action
regarding employment practices.
The clear indication of Touche and Transamerica is that a court must
identify evidence of congressional intent in order to recognize an implied
cause of action for employment discrimination under Title IX. If evidence of
congressional intent cannot be found in either the statutory construction of
Title IX or its legislative history, the presumption against recognizing an
implied cause of action controls. Under this "intent based" approach, it is
plausible for a court to recognized a general cause of action in a statute, while
failing to find a specific cause of action for individual provisions of the act. 7 '
Congressional intent is rarely uniform regarding a statute. The evidence
adequate to support a general private right of action may not be sufficient to
establish a private right of action for a specific provision or area, as in Title
IX.
Deciphering the legislative intent for any part of Title IX is not easy.
As the Court recognized in North Haven, there is a dearth of legislative
history.' Of course courts have frequently faced this problem when dispos
1' Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 189-90 (1988) (Scalia, J. concurring)
(citations omitted).
170 The Borak, Touche, and Piper line of cases support this point. Though all involved
issues of implied actions under the Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78, the Court found
implied actions in some provisions of the Act, but not in others. Similarly, the Transamerica
decision recognized a cause of action under § 215 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, but
not under § 206. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 18-24.
171 North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 527 (1982). Commentators have
also criticized the lack of legislative history. See, e.g., Nancy Peterson, Note, Lieberman v.
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ing of implied action claims. Inherently, implied action cases are not condu-
cive to a congressional intent analysis. By the very nature of implied cause of
action cases, there normally is no clear evidence of intent to identify. Para-
doxically, the right of action the court must find is one whose very existence
Congress did not expressly acknowledge.' 72 Thus, though facially straightfor-
ward, the "intent based" standard forces the court to predict what Congress
would have done if confronted by the specific issue, rather than merely
identifying Congress' general intent. In order to accomplish this feat, the
Court uses doctrines of statutory construction and interpretation of legislative
history to infer congressional intent from the legislative record. The use of
this deductive method permits the Court to stray from a strict statutory
approach. This leads some observers to conclude that the test is inadequate
as a model for the Court's holdings and that, in practice, is often nothing more
than purpose-based analysis disguised in the language of congressional
intent. 173
Although Title IX's design is simple and its legislative history sparse,
it is possible to gain some insight from an examination of its statutory
construction and history. The following sections will attempt to illuminate
these insights through a detailed examination of Congress' treatment of Title
IX, Title VII, and the relationship between the two. This analysis starts with
an examination of the language of Title IX. If congressional intent can be
found unambiguously in the words of a statute there is no need to make
investigations beyond that point. 174
Univ. of Chicago: Refuisal to Imply a Damages Remedy Under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 1983 WIs. L. REv. 181, 199 (1983) ("Title IX as it stands today imposes
a broad ban on sex discrimination without specific congressional definition of what constitutes
discrimination or how it should be remedied in individual cases.")
172 See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 77 (1992) (Scalia, J.
concurring).
7 See HARIED, supra note 139, at 370-72, 381 (the Supreme Court should return to a
common law theory for defining implied rights of action and discard the statutory construction
examination).
1' See, e.g., Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1980)
( The key to the inquiry [whether a private right of action exists] is the intent of the Legislature.
We look first, of course, to the statutory language, particularly the provisions made therein for
enforcement and relief. Then we review the legislative history and other traditional aids of
statutory interpretation .... ) (citations omitted); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979) ('[W]hat must ultimately be determined is whether Congress
intended to create the private remedy asserted... Accordingly, we begin with the language of
the statute itself.").
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1. Statutory Language of Title IX
The wording of Title IX provides little insight into whether an action
for employment discrimination exists. Title IX provides for neither private
enforcement, nor does it imply Congressional contemplation of relief through
customary suits. 75 Rather, its provisions simply proscribe certain conduct
and authorize federal fund termination for those institutions which ignore that
proscription 76 The only solid indication of Congressional intent is Congress'
desire to rid public education of sex based discrimination."77 The statute gives
no indication of the degree of the courts authority to enforce the act, the
precise scope of the title's reach, or whether the title's focus is purely reme-
dial or also compensatory. As a result, courts must look beyond the express
language of the title, examining the statute for implicit evidence of intent. The
Cannon decision provides instruction for examining the statute for intent.
Although the Cannon Court did not specifically examine the lan-
guage of Title TX, it referred to Title IX's language in applying the Cort test.
In the first instance, the Court noted that the Title IX language was similar to
the language in Title VI, and concluded that Title VI was the model for Title
]X 78 From this use of similar language, and from other evidence, the Court
concluded that Congress intended Title IX to be construed similarly to Title
VI. Title VI had been read as providing a private cause of action. 79 Based on
this deductive reasoning, the Court found congressional intent for a Title IX
cause of action. Though perhaps correct as to Title IX generally, this reading
of Title IX does not support the existence of a specific private right of action
for employment discrimination. Title VI, by its language, does not pertain to
employment practices, except where the primary purpose of the federal
assistance is to provide employment. 8 ' Thus, even if Congress was aware of
the Supreme Court's holdings regarding Title VI, and even if Congress
desired that the Court interpret Title IX similarly, it does not follow that
Congress also expected or intended the Court to find a private right of action
for employment discrimination. As Justice Blackmun noted in North Haven,
'" See eg., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979) (By
drafting § 215 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 so that any contract in violation of the
section was rendered "void," Congress altered defendant's civil liabilities and thus implied an
intent to allow legal actions to avoid a contract under the statute. In contrast, the language of
§ 206 of the Act simply makes certain practices by investment advisors "unlawful" and thus
does not indicate congressional intent to create a cause of action).
176 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
" See Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 691-95 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd465 U.S.
555 (1983).
378 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-96 (1976).
179 Id. at 698-99.
18042 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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although the statues are similar, the Court must take notice of slight differ-
ences between the two.181 In the event there are discernible differences
between the language and legislative history of each, he maintained, courts
should not hold Title VI precedent as persuasive. He argues that Congress
could not have anticipated that courts would find a private right of action for
employment discrimination when Title VI's scope is expressly limited to
non-employment relationships. The parallels between Title IX and Title VI
that existed in Cannon simply do not exist in the specific area of employment
discrimination.
The Cannon Court next looked to the wording of Title IX during its
examination of Cort's third factor: statutory purpose. The Court noted that
Title IX expressly provided an enforcement mechanism to deter institutions
from employing discriminatory practices."8 2 However, the Court discounted
this mechanism as inadequate to fulfill one of the Act's purposes: the
protection of citizens from discriminatory conduct by educational institutions.
It considered fund termination inappropriate and too severe a remedy for
isolated discriminatory acts against single individuals."8 3 Without an opportu-
nity for individual relief, the court explained that the Title's beneficiaries
would confront the formidable burden of showing that the discriminatory
practices were pervasive before they might gain protection."14
Again, the Court's argument is unavailable in the situation of an
employment discrimination claim. Victims of employment discrimination are
not without recourse. Title VII provides plaintiffs with effective remedies for
any injury that they may have suffered. After the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Title VII plaintiffs may receive punitive damages, and in some instances,
attorneys' fees."8 5
Thus, both the language of Title IX and the inferences from it are
largely ambiguous and provide little aid for the detailed inquiry of whether
Title IX supports an implied right of action for employment discrimination." 6
1" North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 530 (1982).
" Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.
1Id. at 704-05.
1141d. at 705.
"I Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, Title I, §§ 105 Stat. 1071, 1073-1074
(1991).
"The existence of the express enforcement provision of fund termination should make
a court "chary of reading others into it." Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11, 19 (1979). This analysis suggests that Congress did not intend any implied causes of
action under Title IX. The Cannon Court rejected this reasoning. The Cannon majority stated
that the Court normally avoids "excursion[s] into extrapolation of legislative intent." Cannon,
444 U.S. at 711. Yet, it appears that in the following term, however, the Court did extrapolate
legislative intent. In Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560, 571-72 (1979), the
Court held that a private right of action did not exist under § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1934,
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Therefore, other indications of congressional intent---such as legislative
history and statutory construction-must be examined.
2. Preclusion Exception as a Test for Congressional Intent
When the statutory language is silent, one frequently employed
doctrine of statutory is to evaluate the existing remedial and enforcement
schemes. When these provisions are "comprehensive," they may "suffice to
demonstrate congressional intent" to preclude a private cause of action.187
Although the Court has largely restricted application of this so-called
"preclusion exception" to § 1983 actions,"'8 it has also used this reasoning in
implied action cases.'89 This doctrine's logic provides significant doubts that
Congress sought a Title IX cause of action for employment discrimination.
The Supreme court described the basic preclusion exception, ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius90 in National Railroad Passenger Corp.
(A mtrack) v. National Association of Railroad Passengers: 9  "when
legislation expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, courts should
not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume other remedies. 'When a
statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative
of any other mode."" 92 The Court applied this rule to the Amtrack Act,
because the Act explicitlyprovided express remedies in other sections. In subsequent cases, the
Court has accepted this extrapolation as a canon of statutory construction. See, e.g., Middlesex
Co. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n., 453 U.S. 1, 14 (1981) ("In view of these
elaborate enforcement provisions it cannot be assumed that Congress intended to authorize by
implication additional judicial remedies for private citizens .... ). Thus, it seems that the Court
no longer follows Justice Stevens' reasons for rejecting the implication of an express remedy
in Title IX.
" Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. 1, 20
(1981). For a case defining the level of comprehensiveness required, see Wright v. City of
Roanoke, 479 U.S. 418,425 (1987) ("remedial mechanisms provided [by the Housing Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1401 are not] sufficiently comprehensive and effective to raise a clear inference that
Congress intended to foreclose a § 1983 cause of action for the enforcement of tenants'
rights.").
188 See generally Lisa L. Frye, Note, Suter v. Artist M. and Statutory Remedies Under
Section 1983: Alteration Without Justification, 71 N.C. L. RFv. 1171 (1993).
'" See Karahalios v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 529
(1989) (Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 does not confer a private right of
action on federal employees for a union's breach of its duty of fair representation); National
R.R Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n. of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (the
express remedies found in § 307 of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 are the exclusive
means of enforcement of the Act).
"'
9
"Mention of one thing implies exclusion of another." Black's Law Dictionary 581 (6th
ed. 1990).
' 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
"z Id. at 458 (quoting Botany Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929)).
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finding that since it "create[d] a public cause of action for the enforcement of
its provisions and a private cause of action only under very limited circum-
stances" the plaintiff could not assert a cause of action outside of the enforce-
ment provisions provided. 93 The presence of comprehensive enforcement
measures in the statute indicated that Congress intended those measures be
the only means for enforcing the Act. 94
Though the Amtrack holding concerned provisions within the same
statute, its reasoning is applicable to the interaction between Title VII and
Title IX. When Title VII was promulgated in 1964, it contained an exception
for educational institutions. This limitation was one of the few to Title VII's
otherwise broad reach, and it was largely inconsistent with both the policies
and goals of the Civil Rights Act. 195 As a consequence, the drafters of Title
IX planned to eliminate this exception with enactment of Title IX. Initial
drafts of the bill that eventually became Title IX included a provision repeal-
ing the Title VII exception, however, this provision was later removed in
conference committee.
An identical repeal passed as part of the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Act of 1972, two months before the act containing Title IX went to
conference committee. 96 Thus, Title VII protections were once tentatively
included in Title IX. Although the version enacted did not contain the repeal,
it is reasonable to assume that Congress was conscious of the relationship
between the two measures when passing Title IX. As further support for this
proposition, the measures were approved only months apart from one another.
In this context, it is easy to conclude that the two titles are analytically similar
to provisions within the same statute. It is unlikely Congress would have
placed educational institutions under the scope of Title VII, only to allow Title
IX to provide redundant relief. Thus, applying Amtrack's logic, courts should
not expand the coverage of Title IX to subsume Title VII remedies.
The Supreme Court has also applied the expressio unius doctrine to
the relation between the enforcement schemes of two separate statutes. For
instance, in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. Nat ' Sea Clammers
Ass'n.'9 the Court considered which statutory rights the plaintiff could assert
193 Id.
'Id. The Cannon Court rejected this type of analysis as inappropriate for determining
whether Congress intended an implied right of action. Subsequent Supreme Court cases did not
follow this view. See infra note 263-266 and accompanying text.
'9 The exception for educational institutions is found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993). Among the purposes of the Civil Rights acts is that the law should "provide
appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination in the workplace." Civil Rights Act of 1991,
§ 3, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
196 Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(1972).
' 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
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against a state official in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court
explained:
When the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are
sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate
congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under
§ 1983. As Justice Stewart... stated in Chapman v. Hous-
ton Welfare Rights Organization, when "a state official is
alleged to have violated a federal statute which provides its
own comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements
of that enforcement procedure may not be bypassed by
bringing suit directly under § 1983. "198
In a similar action, the Supreme Court denied a claimant's assertion
of a Section 1983 action in tandem with a claim under the Education of the
Handicapped Act.199 Because the latter contained a comprehensive set of
enforcement procedures, the Court determined that Congress intended it to
exclude-the former."' Similarly, when the Court confronted the issue of
whether the Civil Services Reform Act (CSRA)0 1 conferred a private right of
action on federal employees against a breaching union, it relied upon the
"'elemental canon' of statutory construction that where a statute expressly
provides a remedy, courts must be especially reluctant to provide additional
remedies.""2 2 It concluded that:
Just as in United States v. Fausto, we held that the CSRA's
"integrated scheme of administrative and judicial review"
foreclosed an implied right to Court of Claims review, we
follow a similar course here. To be sure, courts play a role
in CSRA... fair representation cases, but only sitting in
review of the FLRA. To hold that the district courts must
entertain such cases in the first instance would seriously
undermine what we deem to be the congressional
scheme... 203
'
98 Id. at 20 (citation omitted).
199 Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
20'Id. at 1013.
201 5 U.S.C. § 7101 (1994).
202 Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 533
(1989) (quoting Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979)).
203 Id. at 536 (citations omitted).
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These holdings suggest that the comprehensive regulatory and enforcement
scheme of Title VII-and Congress' decision to subject educational employ-
ers to that scheme-did not intend to disturb the Title VII system by allowing
complainants to make competing claims under Title IX.
The language and structure of Title IX indicate that Congress did not
contemplate claimants would invoke Title IX to redress incidents of employ-
ment discrimination. However, the search for congressional intent is a multi-
dimensional inquiry. Where the statutory construction is vague, the Court
often looks to other indicia of congressional intent such as the legislative
history of the statute and the circumstances of its enactment.0 4 Ultimately,
indeterminate statutory language must yield to any clear evidence of congres-
sional intent found through other means.20 5 Using this rationale, the legisla-
tive history of Title IX, although sparse, supports the interpretation that is
suggested by the Title's language and statutory construction.
3. Legislative History of Title IX.6
Title IX originated from several proposals in the House of Represen-
tatives suggesting that Congress address the issue of gender discrimination.
The House then held hearings on the issue in 1970. A bill extending Title VI
prohibitions to gender discrimination, amending the Equal Pay Act to include
executive, administrative and professional employees, and expanding Title
VII to public school employees was introduced that year.207 It was not until
the following year, however, that a proposal actually reached the House floor
for a vote.208 That proposal, sponsored by Representative Green, ultimately
became Title IX.
The Senate's counterpart to Representative Green's measure was
introduced on the Senate floor by Senator Birch Bayh in late 1971. He
bypassed the committee process by presenting the measure as an amendment
20Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 18; North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 522
(1982).
205 National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,
458 (1974).
206 Though the Supreme Court in Cannon and North Haven used legislative history to
decide the cases, the history presented in both those opinions is of little help in deciding the
present issue. The legislative record provides no direct indication of Congress' intentions as to
a Title IX private right of action for employment discrimination.
The "circumstantial evidence" used by the Cannon court mainly consisted of recent
Supreme Court cases finding an implied action under Title VI. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-99.
This indication of legislative intent is inapplicable to the present inquiry. See supra note 171.
207 H.R. 16098, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
208 North Haven, 456 U.S. at 523-24 n.13.
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to the Aid to Higher Education bill, which Congress was then considering.2"9
The amendment was ruled non-germane, but was passed when reintroduced in
1972 as part of the 1972 Education Amendments Act.210
The primary difference between Senate and House provisions of Title
IX was the House's requirement that nothing in the title authorize: "action by
any department or agency with respect to employment practices... except
where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide
employment."2 ' When the two bills went to the conference committee this
condition was eliminated without explanation.212 In late May 1972, the
conference committee provided the reconciled bills to each house. Title IX
passed as part of the Education Amendments Act of 1972.
Aspects of this modest legislative history indicate a lack of congres-
sional intent to create, or to permit the courts to create, a Title IX cause of
action for employment discrimination. There is persuasive evidence that
Congress intended employment discrimination claims to be exclusively
redressed by Title VII from the language of Title IX to the statements made by
its legislative sponsors.
A central provision of both bills was the repeal of Title VII's exemp-
tion of educational institutions from compliance with requirements of that
title. The House Report described this repeal by saying Title IX: "would
remove that exemption (for educational employees) and bring those in
education under the equal employment provision (of Title VI). '213 Senator
Bayh expressed a similar opinion. One of these passages, quoted by the
North Haven opinion, describes the centrality of the repeal of the Title VII
education exemption to Senator Bayh's bill: "basically it closes loopholes in
existing legislation relating to general education programs and employment
resulting from those programs... Other important provisions in the amend-
ment would extend the equal employment opportunities provisions of Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to educational institutions .... ,214
The House Report and Senator Bayh's statements make it appear that
Congress intended to have employment discrimination claims redressed under
Title VII not Title IX. While a private cause of action under Title IX would
209 117 CONG. Rc. 30155-58 (1971).
20 118 CONG.REC. 5802-5815 (1972). Unfortunately, the measure's introduction as an
amendment makes a court's interpretation task that much more difficult since no committee
reports discussing the measure exist to elucidate the intent of the Senate. Floor debate and the
conference committee's brief report are all the Court had to rely on when trying to determine
Congress' goals.
211 S. CONF. REP. No. 92-798, 92d Cong, 2d Sess., 221 (1972).
212 id.
213 H.R. REp. No. 92-554, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1971).
214North Haven, 456 U.S. at 524 (citing 118 CONG. REc. 5803 (1972) (remarks of Sen.
Bayh)).
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also serve to close "loopholes," nothing in the legislative history implied that
Title IX would provide that service. Nor did the legislative history indicate
that an implied cause of action would be available to provide a second level of
protection for educational employees, despite the comprehensive summary of
Title IX's benefits. The inference is that Congress legislated with the intent
of solving the issue of sex discrimination in the employment of educational
personnel by repairing Title VII, not by creating a new remedy in Title IX.
Ironically, though Title IX was intended to "repair" Title VII, repeal
of the educational exemption was implemented through the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972.215 The Act was considered by the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare in October of 1971. The Committee
indicated that repeal of the exemption for employees of educational institu-
tions would provide a remedy for employment discrimination that was
unaddressed by any other statutory provision:
The practices complained of parallel the same kinds of
illegal actions which are encountered in other sectors of
business ... The Committee believes that it is essential that
these employees [of educational institutions] be given the
same opportunity to redress their grievances as are available
to other employees in the other sectors of business.216
It would not be "essential" to bring education employees within the
umbrella of Title VII if they were able to redress their grievances independ-
ently and more easily through Title IX. Indeed, if Congress had intended that
the courts' implied cause of action apply to educational employment relation-
ships, there would have been no need to eliminate the Title VII exception for
educational employees. The scant legislative history of both acts implies that
Congress intended educational employees to have access to the same cause of
action available to employees in other sectors of business.
Moreover, if Congress intended to create a separate scheme for
educational employees, it should have provided administrative procedures
similar to those found in Title VII.217 There is no clear reason for Congress to
215 Janet L. Kuhn, Note, Title IX- Employment and Athletics Are Outside HEW's
Jurisdiction, 65 GEo. L.J. 49, 57 n.47 (1976).
216 S. REP.No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 11-12 (1971); the House Report contained
similar language. See H.R. REP. No. 92-554, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 51-52 (1971). It is notable
that in the legislative history of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 in both the
House and the Senate, there is no comment on the concurrent protection that a private action
under Title IX would provide.
217 Though it is possible that Congress saw educational employees as special, Title VII's
statutory scheme of attempted settlement of grievances is more conducive to academic freedom
than a purely litigation-based regime.
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subject educational employees to the conciliation and deadline requirements
of Title VII, while creating a cause of action that allows claimants to circum-
vent these requirements. Title VII is Congress' most comprehensive and
specific employment discrimination statute. This makes Congress' silence
regarding Title IX's private right of action all the more suspicious. The clear
circumvention of Title VII procedures, combined with an absence of discus-
sion about Title IX's potential preemption of the entire Title VII scheme
suggests that Congress did not envision plaintiffs asserting employment
discrimination actions under Title IX. The simplicity and explicitness with
which Congress repealed the Title VII exemption, without referring to any
possible ramifications for Title IX, supports this interpretation, as does
Congress' failure to create a remedial structure for private causes of action
under Title IX. There does not seem to be any explanation for these inconsis-
tencies other than Congress' intention that Title VII be the exclusive avenue
for remedying employment discrimination in the educational sector.218
5. Title IX Circumvention of Title VH
As described earlier, Title VII is a technically worded statute filled
with several layers of administrative requirements and deadlines. Congress
established the detailed scheme of Title VII in part to ensure that the EEOC
"is given an opportunity to persuade before an aggrieved person may resort to
court action."2 19 The final bill was the result of careful drafting and consider-
ation and spanned over five months of floor debate.Y0
Although much of the Act was the product of careful drafting by the
congressional architects, several aspects of the Act result from one of the most
important political compromises in civil rights history. In fact, the legislative
218 Justice Powell made a similar argument in dissent in North Haven. See North Haven
Bd. ofEduc. v. Bel, 456 U.S. 512, 540, 552-53 (1982). His argument is misplaced, however.
The comparison of the provisions and legislative history of Title VII and Title IX provide a weak
indication that Title IX does not reach employment. However, the comparison of the provisions
provide a much stronger indication that Title IX was not meant to create a competing private
right of action with that created by Title VIL Justice Powell's arguments would have been more
appropriately raised in response to the questions raised in Cannon than those raised in North
Haven.
21 Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 405 F.2d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 1968). Accord, 110
CONG. REC. 14,191 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Javits) ("The only thing this title gives the
Commission is time in which to find that there has been a violation and time in which to seek
conciliation.").
20 The bill voted on by the Senate was 74 pages long. 110 CONG REC. 12,725 (1964).
The House debated the bill from January 31, 1964 to February 10, 1964. 110 CoNG. REC.
1511, 2805 (1964). The Senate, before taking up the bill, engaged in debate from March 9,
1964 until March 26, 1964 over a motion to bypass consideration of the bill by the Judiciary
Committee. 110 CONG. REc. 4743, 6455 (1964). Continuous debate then proceeded on the
bill itself until June 10, 1964 when cloture was imposed. 110 CoNG. REc. 13,327 (1964).
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result of the 1964 debates on the Civil Rights Act is a "classic example of
Congressional compromise. '  Because of the ability of Southern Senators
to sustain one of the longest filibusters in Senate history, portions of the
original act were amended as part of a compromise to secure cloture.222 As a
result, the administrative scheme of the Act may seem haphazard and irratio-
nal. Nevertheless, on several occasions, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
the importance of the Congressional compromise for the Act's passage, and
has subsequently interpreted the language of Title VII in accordance with the
terms of that compromise.223
The detailed enforcement scheme resulting from the compromise and
Congress' careful drafting makes it difficult to accept the existence of an
implied private right of action for employment discrimination under Title IX.
In many instances, a Title IX cause of action for employment discrimination
would not supplement Title VII, but would supplant it. Where a claimant
asserts both Title VII and Title IX actions and the EEOC has the power to
grant relief under Title VII, an additional court created remedy is superfluous.
However, where the EEOC has such power, but is unable to utilize its
available remedies because the plaintiff has not met Title VII's procedural
requirements, a court-created cause of action under Title IX would amount to
circumvention of the regular procedures that other employment discrimination
cases are subject to. It is difficult to imagine that Congress intended this
result.
The significance which Congress placed on advancing certain
objectives in drafting and amending Title VII indicate that Congress likely
would have considered the impact of allowing plaintiffs to assert a Title IX
action for employment discrimination if it had truly intended to create one.
These objectives can be broken down into four categories according to their
statutory expression: enforcement through EEOC litigation; conciliatory
resolution of claims; time limitation of Title VII; and a deferral of claims to
state agencies.
In order to preserve the autonomy of potential defendants and
strengthen state sovereignty, the Senate amended the enforcement provisions
of H.R. 7152 by eliminating the right of the EEOC to issue cease and desist
orders.2 24 This shift in power to pursue a complaint from the EEOC to the
221 Francis T. Coleman, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: Four Years of Procedural
Education, 8 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1969-70).
m See generally id. See also R. Wayne Walker, Title VII: Complaint and Enforcement
and Relief and Remedies, 7 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REv. 495, 523-24 (1966) (hereinafter
WALKER).
mSee, e.g., Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980); Northwest Airlines, Inc.
v. Transport Workers Union of America, 451 U.S. 77, 98 (1981).
2See 110 CONG. REC. 14,331 (1964). Unanswered questions are "especially abundant
in the procedural area because of the last minute creation of a new enforcement system for Title
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victim, and from an administrative agency to the courts, signals a general
distrust of agency politics during the period.22 As part of the "leadership
compromise," this change was instrumental in getting the act passed.
However, after several years of less than encouraging results from conciliation
attempts by the EEOC, and with the EEOC facing a growing backlog of
claims, Congress concluded that employment discrimination was so insidious
that the EEOC needed stronger enforcement procedures. 6 Although it was
important to handle the problem of employment discrimination in the least
confrontational means possible, no actual improvement in employment
equality could be achieved without the availability of some type of stronger
response to recalcitrant employers.227 Therefore, prior to the passage of Title
IX, Congress strengthened the conciliatory measures of the Act.228
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 added a second
level of enforcement for combating employment discrimination. In addition
to the EEOC's use of conciliatory procedures to remedy individual claims,
Congress amended Title VII in 1972 to authorize the institution of suits by the
EEOC in federal district court.22 9 Congress felt that enabling the EEOC to
directly sue employers would both provide enforcement where voluntary
agreements were unreachable, and induce stubborn employers to consider
noncompulsory measures more seriously.230 In addition, Congress preserved
the independent right of claimants to sue. Where the EEOC decides not to sue
or is unable to process the charge within 180 days, or where the claimant is
unsatisfied with the outcome, the claimant may file a suit within 90 days after
receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC.?1
VII as the basis for the so-called 'leadership compromise' necessary to obtain Republican votes
for Senate cloture over debate on the entire Civil Rights Act." WALKER, supra note 222, at 523-
24.
m Id. at 522.
2See, eg., H.R.REP.No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5 (1971); S. REP. No. 92-415,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1971). See also Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 517 F.2d 1301,
1305 & n.7 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976).
m H.R.REP.NO. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1971); S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 5-8 (1971).
mSeegenerallyH.R.REP.No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. REP. No. 92-415,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
29 Pub. L. No. 92-261 § 4, 86 Stat 104 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
2 See, ag., H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong. 1st Sess., at 11 (1971); 114 CONG. REc.
931 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
.. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f(l) and 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (1979). These improvements
in the enforcement scheme of Title VII did not come easily. The Congressional debate on the
1972 Amendments spanned almost three months and filled nearly 500 pages of the
Congressional Record.
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Congress was explicit about its preference for providing the Commis-
sion with enforcement authority of its own. Congress made it clear that
private actions alone provided inadequate enforcement of the Act and were
not the preferred means of relief.2 2 Accordingly, the major issue of disagree-
ment was not whether to create administrative enforcement procedures, but
rather what type of administrative procedure should be created.233 Congress
ultimately chose EEOC suits in federal court, rather than administrative
"cease and desist" orders, as the principal enforcement mechanism of the
Act.234 "Under either scheme, however,... Congress fully expected that the
enforcement activities of the Commission, and not private lawsuits, would
carry the major burden of realizing the goals of Title VIL." Congress did
not seriously consider using private suits as the primary enforcement mecha-
nism.36 The Joint Conference Committee report summarized the enforcement
provisions of the bill: "It is hoped that recourse to the private lawsuit will be
the exception and not the rule, and that the vast majority of complaints will be
handled through the office of the EEOC or the Attorney General, as appropri-
ate."'211 The timetable for private actions also reflects this preference, by
circumscribing the time within which a cause of action may be brought.238
Similarly, Congress gave the Commission both exclusive jurisdiction once it
filed suit, and authority to intervene in suits filed by individuals.239
232 118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972).
213 See 117 CONG. REC. 31960-62 (1971) (statements of Rep. Perkins and Rep. Quie);
118 CONG. REc. 696 (1972) (statement of Sen. Dominick).
I Though there was clear support in Congress for additional enforcement powers for the
EEOC, members were split on what type of powers should be added. One contingent urged use
of administrative cease and desist orders to enforce the Act, while another group, led by Senator
Dominick and supported by the Nixon Administration, advocated the eventual scheme of direct
authority for the EEOC to sue in district court. The Dominick alliance was able to force
adoption of the latter scheme through a month-long filibuster. See generally Occidental Life
Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355,358-64(1976).
... EEOC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 373 F. Supp. 1321, 1328 (D. Del. 1974).
236 See Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 364 (1977) ("During the course of [the Senate]
debate there were only a few isolated and ambiguous references to the provision in the substitute
bill authorizing federal suits by complainants dissatisfied with EEOC delay.") (citations omitted).
37118 CONG. REC. 7565 (1972). By establishing the authority for the EEOC to initiate
litigation, Congress did not reject the role of private suits. Congress retained these suits as a
means for claimants "to avoid any prejudice to their rights as a result of government
inadvertence, delay and error.". Id. See also E.L DuPont, 373 F. Supp. at 1329.
8 Section 706(f)(1) of the 1972 Amendments expressly provided for termination of the
individual's right to sue 90 days after vesting, but there is no comparable limitation for suits
brought by the EEOC. See E.. DuPont, 373 F. Supp. at 1329.
" Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92- 261, § 706(f)(1), 86
Stat. 103, 105-06 (1972).
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It is clear from the original committee reports that one advantage of
an EEOC enforcement scheme was the expertise that the EEOC would bring
to resolution of employment discrimination claims.240 Introducing the bill to
the House, the spokesman for the bill observed:
The same consideration which led to the adoption of admin-
istrative enforcement in other areas are equally applicable
here. Perhaps the most important of these is the need for the
development and application of expertise in the recognition
and solution of employment discrimination prob-
lems-particularly as these problems are presented in their
more complex, institutional forms.4
In reference to an amendment substituting EEOC suits in district
court for EEOC "cease & desist" orders (the original scheme contained in the
Senate bill), Senator Dominick noted the amendment "would bring together
and preserve both the expertise of the EEOC in investigating, processing, and
conciliating unfair employment cases [with] the expertise and freedom... of
the federal courts."242 It is clear that whichever enforcement scheme Congress
was to adopt, there was almost uniform agreement that it should somehow
entail a type of EEOC-initiated action.
A Title IX "private suit" would undermine Title VII's policy of
conciliatory resolution of discrimination claims. From the beginning, empha-
sis has been placed on conciliation. When the Civil Rights Act was originally
enacted in 1964, conciliation measures were the only real remedial method
provided by statute. Congress considered other enforcement schemes but
chose to implement only noncompulsory remedies. The legislative history of
the Act:
establishes conclusively and beyond doubt that Congress
intended that conciliation be preferred to coercion and that
the conciliation step would be a prerequisite to the institu-
tion of a civil action under this title. [T]he Report of the
House Education and Labor Committee on the bill providing
for adjudication by the Commission stated that: "It is the
intent of the Committee that maximum efforts be concen-
trated on informal and voluntary methods of eliminating
unlawful employment practices before commencing formal
240 S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1971).
24, 117 CONG. REc. 31960 (1971) (statement of Rep. Perkins).
242 117 CONG. REC. 40290 (1971).
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procedures" . .. [which] "should be pursued only when
informal methods fail or appear futile., 241
Because the 1972 Amendments to Title VII provided additional
enforcement to the persuasion and conciliatory scheme, it is mistaken to
presume this type of relief fell into disfavor with Congress after 1972.
Although Congress in 1972 recognized that voluntary measures were insuffi-
cient by themselves to remedy the problem, provisions mandating conciliatory
attempts to resolve claims were retained in the bill as the initial response to
discriminatory practices. As Congressman Perkins, the House sponsor of the
bill, stated: "The conferees contemplate that the Commission will continue to
make every effort to conciliate as is required by existing law. Only if concilia-
tion proves to be impossible do we expect the Commission to bring action in
Federal district court to seek enforcement. 2
44
When Senator Javits, who sponsored the committee's cease and
desist bill, sought to amend the opposition's bill (by requiring that the EEOC
bring a civil action if conciliation attempts failed after 30 days), Senator
Dominick objected to mandatory filing of a suit and proposed that the EEOC
merely be given permission to file suit.245 Senator Dominick justified this
substitute:
[W]hat we are trying to do whenever we can is to have the
unlawful employment practice charge solved by voluntary
compliance. I think that all of us would prefer to see this
rather than a commission filing a cease-and-desist order, or
as in my amendment, having to go to court.
It would seem to me that in the interest of flex-
ibility. . . in working something out through voluntary
243 Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 265 F. Supp. 56, 58 (N.D. Ala. 1967)
(Congressional intent that conciliation efforts would be a prerequisite to instituting a civil
action):
[W]hile the bill originally contained a clause
which would have permitted the institution of
a civil action "in advance" of conciliation, this
clause was eliminated from the bill through
amendment in the House for the express
purpose of insuring that civil actions would
not be brought until there had been
conciliation.
Id. at 59. See also Mickel v. S.C. State Employment Serv., 377 F.2d 239, 242 (4th Cir.
1967) (citing Dent with approval).
244 118 CONG. REC. 7563 (1972).
24' 118 CONG. REC. 1068-69 (1972).
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compliance, it would be far better to put in the word
,may. ,,2 46
In response, Senator Javits agreed to delete the mandatory language. 2
47
Courts also have recognized the importance of conciliation in the
statutory scheme of Title VII. The Supreme Court observed that the "com-
plex administrative and judicial process" of Title VII was specifically de-
signed to provide "an opportunity for nonjudicial and non-adversary resolu-
tion of claims." '24 As the Court explained in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co.:249 "Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... to
assure equality of employment opportunities.... Cooperation and voluntary
compliance were selected as the preferred means for achieving this goal." '
Affirming this view five years later, the Novotny Court characterized the
administrative process of Title VII as "crucial" in the Title VII scheme. 1
The courts, moreover, deem conciliation attempts as conditions
precedent to EEOC suits, 2 and will dismiss any action brought by the
Commission when an attempt to conciliate has not been made. 3  This
legislative preference is further reflected in the unlimited time the EEOC has
for conciliation efforts.
This Congressional philosophy, that the competing needs of employ-
ees and employers are best accommodated by conciliation, is inconsistent with
Title IX's implied right of action for employment discrimination. Such an
implied right of action nullifies the Title VII conciliatory procedures. Both in
1964 and in 1972, Congress had the opportunity to design such a system for
Title VII, but chose not to design it.
Third, a private cause of action under Title IX would circumvent the
specific time lines established for each step of the Title VII procedural
scheme. Though these timetables may seem arbitrary, they reflect policy
choices made by Congress when drafting the Title. 4 In reference to one of
246 118 CONG. REC. 1069 (1972).
247 Id.
248 Great Am. Fed. S. & L. Ass'n. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366,372-73 (1978).
249415 U.S. 36 (1974).
21 Id. at 44.
251 Great American Fed. S. & L. Ass'n. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366,376 (1978).
212 EEOC v. Continental Oil Co., 548 F.2d 884, 889 (10th Cir. 1977).
21ld. at 890.
Policies include federalism concerns, see Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 820-
21 (1980) (citing 110 CONG. Rnc. 11937 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)); insuring due
process, see 117 CONG. REc. 31,972; insuring fairness to both parties, see Electrical Workers
v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229,240 n.14 (1976); avoiding state claims, see 110 CONG.
REc. 7214 (1964); and promoting the conciliatory resolution of claims, see 118 CONG. REc.
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these timetables,"5 the Supreme Court stated: "It should not be forgotten that
time-limitations provisions themselves promote important interests; 'the
period allowed for instituting suit inevitably reflects a value judgment
concerning the point at which the interest in favor of protecting valid claims
are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale
ones."'256
Recognizing on several occasions that these procedural provisions are
not inconsequential and were "defined with precision," the Supreme Court has
applied them strictly, even in the face of harsh results.25 7 Correspondingly, a
court would be remiss to recognize a cause of action in Title IX that com-
pletely avoids these requirements. To recognize a cause of action would
produce the anomalous result of enabling a discrimination claim filed by a an
employee of an educational institution to survive summary judgment though
the claim was untimely. At the same time, a claim filed by an employee
outside of the educational field would fail under the same circumstances. It is
unlikely that Congress intended such a result.
It is even less likely that Congress intended Title IX to circumvent the
federalism interests that influenced the structure of Title VII. Congress
fashioned Title Vil's procedures so that "State anti-discrimination laws...
play an integral role in the congressional scheme."258 In states having an
equal employment program, plaintiffs must first exhaust--and the EEOC
must defer to---remedies provided by that state's employment agency.259
This deference was intended to preserve the traditional state authority over
employment relationships,' while insuring the efficient handling of claims.26'
The 1964 Act's concern for state involvement in the Title VII
procedures--and the inclusion of the mandatory deferral to state agen-
cies-was largely the result of congressional compromise. In order to break
the Senate filibuster, the proponents of the Civil Rights bill were forced to
agree to a compromise proposal forged by the Senate leadership, particularly
1069 (1972).
255 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
'Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250,259-260 (1980) (quoting Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975)).
"l See generally id. at 260-61.
" Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461,468-69 (1982).
2n4 2 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). In 1972, Congress also required the
EEOC, when determining reasonable cause, to accord "substantial weight" to the final findings
and orders of certain agencies. See Pub. L. No. 92-261 § 4(b), 86 Stat. 104 (1972).
260 110 CONG. REC. 12,724-25 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey). In the 1972
amendments, Congress explicitly reiterated its purpose of deferring to state agencies whenever
possible. See 117 CONG. REC. 31960 (1971) (statement of Rep. Perkins).
261 Id. See also 118 CONG. REC. 1812-13 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Allen).
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Senator Dirksen.262 One of the main tenants of the "Dirksen Compromise"
was that state regulatory schemes would be preserved, while federal authority
to intercede and protect civil rights also be maintained.263 Senators opposing
the Civil Rights Act had long argued that the bill would destroy state control
of a traditionally local interest. The procedures which mandated deferment to
state agencies were intended to address this concern. Thus, deference to state
authority was a major political component of the final act.
An implicit cause of action for employment discrimination bypasses
the provisions added by the Dirksen compromise, and in effect undoes the
agreements and decisions of Congress. By allowing a claimant access to
federal court while bypassing the state agency, an implied action for employ-
ment discrimination under Title IX completely abrogates the comity consider-
ations built into Title VII's machinery.
Various Supreme Court opinions indicate that the Court appreciates
the separation of powers concern. As the Court stated inMohasco Corp. v.
Silver: "We must respect the compromise embodied in the words chosen by
Congress. It is not our place simply to alter the balance struck by Congress in
procedural statutes by favoring one side or the other in matters of statutory
construction. ' 264 Courts should exhibit similar restraint in construing Title
IX.
An implicit cause of action under Title IX circumvents these four
features of Title VII. This provides clear, if circumstantial, indications that
Congress did not intend Title IX's implied cause of action to reach employ-
ment practices.265 Congress would have provided some acknowledgment if it
wanted to bypass these basic considerations. In the absence of such express
intent, or a credible reason why Congress might detach educational employ-
ment discrimination from the scope of Title VII, a court should not reflexively
stretch Title IX's implied cause of action into Title VII's domain. By stretch-
ing Title IX's implied causes of actions, the court is acting as lawmaker in the
most pernicious sense. Courts lack debates, hearings and a public mandate
for actions of these sorts. They are inappropriate bodies to circumvent
statutory schemes through inferences of legislative intent. The selection of a
See Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 819-20 (1980).
28 110 CONo REC. 12,721-25 (1964). See also Richard Berg, Equal Employment
Opportunity Under the CivilRights Act of 1964,31 BROOK. L. REv. 62 (1965) ("With respect
to Title VII there were three principal areas of difference between the House-passed bill and the
so-called 'leadership compromise': ... (2) the relationship of the title to state fair employment
laws and procedures.. ." Id. at 66).
2' Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980). See also Northwest Airlines v.
Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 98 (1981) (refusing to find an implied action for contribution
in the enforcement scheme of Title VII).
'See generally North Haven Bd. ofEduc. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 552-54 (1982) (Powell,
. dissenting).
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policy "which is most advantageous to the whole involves a host of consider-
ations that must be weighed and appraised. That function is more appropri-
ately for those who write the laws, rather than for those who interpret
them."26
6
In similar contexts, courts have shown self-restraint. Inferring
Congress' intent from the incongruity that results from allowing one act to
frustrate the carefully tailored scheme of another, courts have restricted the
scope to areas of non-overlapping concerns. Two of these opinions are
especially revealing.
In Smith v. Robinson,267 the plaintiffs were parents of a handicapped
boy who was denied funding for a special educational program. They asserted
claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988,268 the Education of the Handicapped Act,269
and under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973270 for deprivation of a state
sponsored education. The Court had "little difficulty concluding that Con-
gress intended the EHA to be the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff
may assert an equal protection claim to a publicly financed special
education." '271 The Court recognized that Congress created specific proce-
dures in the EHA to allow as much local resolution of claims as possible, and
concluded that to allow plaintiffs to maintain their § 1983 action would
circumvent this approach. 72 The Court stated:
In light of the comprehensive nature of the procedures and
guarantees set out in the EHA and Congress' express efforts
to place on local and state educational agencies the primary
responsibility for developing a plan to accommodate the
needs of each individual handicapped child, we find it diffi-
cult to believe that Congress also meant to leave undisturbed
the ability of a handicapped child to go directly to court with
an equal protection claim to a free appropriate public educa-
tion. Not only would such a result render superfluous most
of the detailed procedural protections outlined in the statute,
but, more important, it would also run counter to Congress'
view that the needs of handicapped children are best accom-
z" United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 512-13 (1954).
267468 U.S. 992 (1984).
268 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
'9 Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 90-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970) (codified
as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1464 (1994)).
270 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 394 (1973) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 704 (1994))
271 Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984).
272 id.
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modated by having the parents and the local education
agency work together to formulate an individualized plan.273
Turning to the plaintiffs claim under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
the Court observed that since § 504 and the EHA were "different substantive
statutes," the comparative analysis of the EHA and § 504 required a different
approach than was used with plaintiff's equal protection claim.274 The
difference between the two acts is comparable to the difference between the
substantive content of Titles IX and VII. Therefore, the Court's analysis
provides a good model for addressing the present inquiry.
The Court explained that both measures cover largely the same
conduct: equal access to state programs and facilities.27S The ERA, however,
requires specific substantive and procedural rights in order to provide free and
adequate public education27 6 The Court concluded that the requirements
imposed by the two statutes are different, and that "the substantive and
procedural rights assumed to be guaranteed by both statutes are specifically
required onlyby the EA."277 This uncertainty about the scope and extent of
any obligation created by § 504 made the majority reluctant to allow the
plaintiffs to bypass the remedies and procedures of the EHA by asserting a
§ 504 claim.278
2"Id. at 1011-12.
274 Id. at 1016.
275 Id. at 1017.
276 Id. at 1018-19. Because both statutes are grounded on similar interests, the Court
observed, the two measures' "substantive requirements, as applied to the right of a handicapped
child to a public education, have been interpreted to be strikingly similar." Id. at 1017.
'n Id. at 1018. The Court explained why it felt § 504 did not require the same substantive
and procedural rights as the EHA: "In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, the Court
emphasized that § 504 does not require affirmative action on behalf of handicapped persons,
but only the absence of discrimination... In the EHA, on the other hand, Congress specified the
affirmative obligations imposed on States to ensure that equal access to a public education is not
an empty guarantee." Id. at 1018-19 (citations omitted).
27 The Court explained:
Even assuming that the reach of§ 504 is coextensive with that of the EHA, there is no
doubt that the remedies, rights, and procures Congress set out in the EHA are the ones
it intended to apply to a handicapped child's claim to a free appropriate public education.
We are satisfied that Congress did not intend a handicapped child to be able to circumvent
the requirements or supplement the remedies of the EHA by resort to the general
anti-discrimination provision of § 504. The only elements added by § 504 are the
possibility of circumventing EHA administrative procedures and going straight to court
with a § 504 claim.
Id. at 1019.
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Although Title IX and Title VII do not differ in the affirmative
obligations they mandate, they differ in the procedural requirements and in the
precision with which Congress specified the scope and remedies of each Act.
Title VII sets up very explicit procedures for an employment discrimination
claim, while Title IX does not. Similarly, Title IX is unclear as to its scope
and remedies for employment discrimination, 79 but Title VII was expressly
drafted to remedy these types of practices. At the same time, Title IX adds
nothing to plaintiff's substantive rights. Therefore, the Court's conclusion in
Smith also applies to Titles IX and VII: the only element added by Title IX is
the possibility of circumventing Title VIl's administrative procedures and
going straight to court with a Title IX claim.2"'
The second comparison case, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,281
involves the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Securities Act of 1933282
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.283 Starting with J.L Case Co. V
Borak various sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts have been the subject of
Supreme Court cases charting the boundaries for the implied rights of action
doctrines. 5 One of the early decisions in this chain of implied right of action
cases was Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,286 in
which the Court recognized an implied right of action in Section 10(b)-5 of
the 1934 Act for the use of any deceptive or manipulative device in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of securities.87 The opinion did not indicate,
however, whether scienter was a necessary element of the cause of action, or
I Although the Supreme Court has found that Title IX contains a private right of action
and applies to employment practices, these were not at all self-evident decisions. In neither case
did Congress explicitly indicate that Title IX had these features. In fact, before the Supreme
Court made each ruling, circuit courts were split on their interpretation of the relevant legislative
history. The Court made a decisive holding in each case, but it must be noted that the statutes
involved did not afford the contrast of Title IX with the overlapping and more explicit statute
of Title VII.
I Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1019 (1984). Smith, however, provides an alternate
conclusion. In footnote 22, the majority suggests that "[iun view of the substantial overlap
between the two statutes," cases arguably within the EHA carry the presumption that plaintiff
must exhaust the EHA remedies and procedures. Id. at 1019 n.22. The same presumption
could be applied to Title IX claims within the scope of Title VII.
21 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
282 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a.
283 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j.
284 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
285 See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 329, 280 n.9 (1983) for a list of
cases.
286 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
287Id. at 9-13.
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whether negligence sufficied. Predictably, this issue eventually found its way
before the Court, and was resolved in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.288
The importance of the Ernst & Ernst decision is the manner in which
the Court came to its resolution. The reasoning of the Court, if applied to the
conflict between Title IX and Title VII, supports the conclusion that Title IX
preempts Title VII in the area of employment discrimination.
In arriving at his decision that scienter was necessary for an action
under Section 10(b)-5, Justice Powell compared the express civil remedies in
the 1933 Act, which permitted recovery for negligent conduct, with those of
Section 10(b)-5.2 89 Observing that the express remedies placed several
procedural restricitons on plaintiffs, Justice Powell concluded:
We think these procedural limitations indicate that the
judicially created private damages remedy under §10(b)-5
-which has no comparable restrictions-cannot be ex-
tended, consistently with the intent of Congress, to actions
premised on negligent wrongdoing. Such extension would
allow causes fo action covered by §§ 11, 12(2), and 15 to be
brought instead under § 10(b) and thereby nullify the effec-
tiveness of the carefully drawn procedural restrictions on
these express actions.
29 °
Although the Ernst & Ernst decision involves the interpretation of
security exchange legislation rather than employment discrimination legisla-
tion, the reasoning of the opinion is still germaine. The case stands for the
general proposition that in the face of provisions within a companion act
which provide the same relief, but which require a plaintiff to fulfill specific,
procedural conditions before bringing suit, the presumption must be that
Congress did not intend the judiciary to allow plaintiffs to use the companion
provision to circumvent the other, more restrictive provision.
This reasoning applies to Title IX and Title VII. Although it is
conceivable that Congress intended Title IX to be a modification of Title VII,
with the addition of a new remedy (federal fund termination) and with more
relaxed procedural restrictions, this is highly unlikely. There is simply no
apparent reason for Congress to create such an exception for educational
employees alone. Further, modification in the form of an almost completely
redundant private right of action is even harder to accept. As Justice Powell
indicated in Ernst & Ernst, the judiciary should only expand a judicially
created cause of action to replace an express cause of action if there exists
28 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
2
" Id. at 206-11.
290Id. at 210 (citations and footnote omitted).
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substantial support in the legislative history to make such a change. 291 As
there is no such legislative history to support supplanting Title VII with Title
IX, a court would be acting irresponsibly if it expanded Title IX into the area
of employment discrimination.
Justice Powell made a comparable argument in his North Haven
dissent, contending that "no competent legislative draftsman would have
written" Title IX intending it to have the meaning the majority assigned it.292
In support of this argument, he contrasted the ambiguity of Title IX to the
detailed provisions of Title VII and concluded that Congress would not have
enacted the inconsistent provisions of the latter if it had meant it to overlap
with the former.293
Justice Blackmun responded to these contentions in footnote 26 of
the majority opinion.294 His response is instructive in its misinterpretation of
the conflict between Title VII and Title IX. Initially, he argued that Justice
Powell's reasoning was unsubstantiated since the Court "repeatedly has
recognized that Congress has provided a variety of remedies, at times overlap-
ping, to eradicate employment discrimination." '295 He cited three cases,
Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc.,296 Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc.,297 and Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.29 as examples of
such holdings. However, Justice Blackmun failed to recognize that overlap-
ping remedies did not concern Justice Powell. Rather, Justice Powell was
concerned about the inconsistency between the comprehensive and detailed
scheme of Title VII and the lack of administrative requirements in Title IX.
In fact, one of the bases for Justice Powell's conclusions was the contrast
between the lack of remedies uniquely suited for employment discrimination
violations in Title IX and the conspicuous presence of such remedies in Title
VII. In this respect, it was actually the lack of remedial redundancy that
concerned Justice Powell, not its overabundance.
Moreover, based on the cases cited by Justice Blackmun, it is
questionable whether his position is firmly grounded in law. Although the
holdings in the three cases sustained actions asserting remedies that over-
lapped with Title VII, the Court in these decisions ruled based on legislative
291 Id. at 211.
mNorth Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 551 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
293 Id. at 552.
294 Id. at 535 n.26.
' Id. In support of this statement, Justice Blackmun cited Electrical Workers v. Robbins
& Myers, Inc. 429 U.S. 229 (1976), Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454
(1975) and Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
296 429 U.S. 229 (1976).
291421 U.S. 454 (1975).
298 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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history indicating that Congress intended to leave intact preexisting alterna-
tive remedies to Title VII. This suggested that Congress meant individuals to
have the opportunity to pursue rights under both Title VII and other applica-
ble state and federal statutes. However, since Title IX was enacted after Title
VII it's remedies are not a "preexisting remedies" and are not subject to
Congress' command. Thus, the reasoning of Alexander, Electrical Workers,
and Johnson is largely inapplicable to the question of whether Title IX
supplants, or is preempted by, Title VII.
The second reason these cases are inapposite is that they involved
claims based on independent rights. In all three cases, the plaintiffs were
seeking relief for violations of separate substantive rights. In Alexander, the
plaintiff alleged he had been discharged from employment because of his
race.299 He presented his claim to an arbitration panel and then instituted a
Title VII action in federal court. The district court ruled that the plaintiff had
waived his right to bring a Title VII suit by submitting his grievance to the
arbitration process? °' The Supreme Court reversed, observing that Title VII's
rights were separate and distinct from those guaranteed to the plaintiff under
the collective bargaining agreement. 01 The Robbins and Johnson opinions
also rested on distinctions between different rights created by the statutes at
issue3 2 Since the employees in these cases were basing their claims on rights
of independent origin, "no inconsistency result[ed] from permitting both
rights to be enforced in their respectively appropriate forums." '
In contrast, the Court in Great American Federal Savings & Loan v.
Novotny held that a claimant may not invoke § 1985 as a remedy when Title
VII provides the basis for the claim.30 The Court invalidated plaintiffs
§ 1985 claim because it rested on the same right as asserted in plaintiff s Title
VII claim. Instead of asserting a single right with "two basic rights" as was
asserted in Alexander, Robbins and Johnson, the plaintiff in Novotny merely
asserted two different remedies for the same right.0 ' Since this right origi-
211 Id. at 39-43.
300 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012, 1014 (Co. 1971). But see
Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992) (plaintiff may be bound
by agreement to arbitrate Title VII claim); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20 (1991) (plaintiff bound by is agreement to arbitrate age discrimination claim.).
303 Alexander, 415 U.S. at 48-49. (The Court also based its opinion on the
inappropriateness of arbitration as a forum for the resolution of Title VII issues.).
302 Robbins & Meyers, 429 U.S. at 238 (claimant brought claims under grievance
procedures pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement and under Title VII.). See also
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454,459 (1975).
" Alexander, 415 U.S. at 50.
'" 442 U.S. 366, 378 (1979). 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) is a remedial
statute which addresses conspiracies which interfere with civil rights.
30s Novotny, 442 U.S. at 377-78.
19961
234 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PuBLIC POLICY
nated in Title VII, and since a claim under § 1985 would allow the plaintiff to
circumvent the Title VII procedures, the Court ruled that Title VII was the
plaintiff's exclusive avenue or relief.3 °6
Returning to the conflict between Title VII and Title IX, it is now
clear that Justice Blackmun overstated the amount of support Alexander,
Electrical Workers and Johnson provide for his argument. The issue of
whether Title VII preempts Title IX is more akin to the issue litigated in
Novotny than the one at the center of the Alexander, Electrical Workers and
Johnson disputes. A plaintiff asserting a claim under Title VII and Title IX
is claiming protection under the same right, not independent rights. No
additional interests are protected by a Title IX claim; under both statues,
employers are simply prohibited from making employment decisions on the
basis of sex. Thus, extending the right of action under Title IX to employ-
ment discrimination would not simply involve recognizing overlapping
remedies, as was done in Alexander, Electrical Workers and Johnson, but
would involve recognizing completely redundant remedies the effect of which
would be to "bypass the administrative process, which plays such a crucial
role in the scheme established by Congress."307
Justice Blackmun's second criticism of Justice Powell's reasoning
regarded Powell's use of comparisons between Title IX and Title VII to
ascertain legislative intent. Blackmun argued that second-guessing Congress
is inappropriate in determining legislative intent, and maintained that reliance
on legislative history, "however truncated," is the only correct method for
determining Congressional intent. °0 This is an extremely myopic view of
statutory interpretation and is unsupported by traditional Supreme Court
statutory review doctrines." 9 When the legislative history does not present a
clear picture of Congress' intent, a court may need to use common sense to
deduce Congressional intent, using comparisons of statutory design and the
306 Id. at 378. Subsequent Supreme Court cases have articulated the same preemption
theme in addressing overlapping statutory claims. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 104 (1984)
(Education of the Handicapped Act was exclusive remedy for a plaintiff asserting an equal
protection claim to a publicly financed education); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l
Sea Clammer Ass'n, 435 U.S. 1, 14 (1981) (Congressional intent to preclude suits under
§ 1983 demonstrated by comprehensiveness of remedial devices in Federal Water Pollution
Control Act); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 22 n.11 (1980) (Powell, J. dissenting) (§ 1983
would be unavailable where "the governing statute provides an exclusive remedy for violations
of its terms.").
7 Great Am. Fed. Says. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 376 (1978). See also
Torres v. Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Social Servs., 592 F. Supp. 922 (E.D.Wis. 1984)
(Plaintiffs could not sue under § 1983 because remedy was available under Title VII. The court
reasoned that the plaintiffs § 1983 "allegations are so tied up with their cause of action under
Title VII that they are... nearly unidentifiable as discreet claims." Id. at 930.).
30 North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 (1982).
309 See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-04 (1978).
[Vol.2:185
TITLE VII & TITLE IX = ?
purposes of prior statutes. Justice Frankfurter understood the importance of
this type of investigation to accurate statutory interpretation: "Often the
purpose or policy that controls is not directly displayed in the particular
enactment. Statutes cannot be read intelligently if the eye is closed to consid-
erations evidenced in affiliated statutes, or in the known temper of legislative
opinion."3 "0 A more restricted view risks producing forced interpretations
that, although sounding consistent with the slim legislative history available,
are counterproductive in their results.
To require that legislative intent be established any other way would
create an unreasonable standard for courts in implied action cases. In the
absence of explicit preambles attached to statutes, the task of deciphering
legislative intent is almost always a practice of "second-guessing" Congress.
Only the exceptional cases contain passages from the Congressional Record
and conference committee reports that clearly reveal Congress' intent on an
issue; and do not require additional inferences from historical information and
statutory structure. This is especially true of implied action cases, since they
normally require interpretation of legislative history on an issue Congress did
not address. In fact, the Cannon Court's reasoning that Congress must have
intended a private cause of action under Title IX because funding termination
is "such a drastic remedy,"3 " is merely interpretation through inference.
Justice Blackmun also joined in this type of "second-guessing" analysis in his
North Haven opinion. He argued that Congress' failure both to disapprove
HEW regulations regarding Title IX's applicability to employment claims,
and to pass an amendment to Title IX limiting its coverage to certain employ-
ment practices were indications of legislative intent to have Title IX apply to
employment.31 Similarly, in Smith v. Robinson,"3 Justice Blackmun con-
cluded: "to the extent § 504 otherwise would allow a plaintiff to circumvent
[the state procedures of the EHA], we are satisfied that the remedy conflicts
310 Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUm. L. REV.
527, 539 (1947).
... Cannon, 441 U.S. at 719 (White, J. dissenting). See also Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 20 (1979) (examining evidence of legislative intent that
express remedies in the Investment Advisor Act be exclusive); Wright v. City of Roanoke
Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 424 (1987) (private right of action
implied in the statutory scheme of the Brooke Amendment).
312 North Haven, 456 U.S. at 532-35. Justice Blackmun qualifies this use of the
post-enactment history of Title IX by noting that this type of evidence "cannot be accorded the
weight of contemporary legislative history" and only lends credence to the Court of Appeals'
interpretation. Id. at 535 (internal quotations omitted). Of course, in the face of little or no
direct legislative history, a court would be remiss not to consider this type of evidence.
313 Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
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with Congress' intent in the EHA." '314 These inferences are no different in
form than Justice Powell's comparison of Titles IX and VII.
The factors outlined above indicate that the legislators did not intend
Title IX to supplant Title VII as the appropriate statute for educational
employees to gain redress for employment discrimination. Considering both
the different procedural requirements, combined with the short timespan in
which they were both enacted, only a rather stark view of Congressional
inconsistency can support concurrent, yet separate, causes of actions. Thus,
the legislative history of Title IX serves to support the same interpretation of
its language accorded by rules of statutory construction. This interpretation
is also consistent with Title IX's relationship with Title VII and the impor-
tance Congress and the courts placed upon Title VII's administrative proce-
dures. Whether this is enough evidence for the Court to infer that Congress
would have meant to exclude a Title IX remedy if they had confronted the
issue is difficult to determine. Certainly, a court must question the lack of
positive indicia that the legislature intended Title IX to act as an additional
protection to Title VII, especially after Congress had applied Title VII to
educational employers only two months earlier. It must have been clear to
Congress that the reach of Title VII clearly overlapped with Title IX. If the
legislature intended to change existing law, it would be expected to say so
explicitly within the legislative record. This at least suggests that courts
should not summarily reject the Title IX-Title VII issue as the Henschke
Court did.
In contrast to the Cannon decision, there is no like concern as to the
need for an implied action for employment discrimination under Title IX to
effectuate the purpose of that title. As defined by the majority opinion of
Cannon, the two purposes of Title IX were to stop federal funds from
supporting discriminatory practices, and to protect victims of discrimina-
tion.315 The Court identified the latter purpose as the one requiring a private
right of action since the express remedy in that statute (federal funding
termination) is severe, and is unlikely to aid an individual victim. The Court
believed that without an opportunity for individual relief, the beneficiaries of
the title would confront the formidable burden of showing that the discrimina-
tory practices were pervasive before they could gain protection. 316 This extra
burden functionally left them remediless.
Alternatively, victims of employment discrimination under Title IX
are not without recourse. Title VII already provides plaintiffs with effective
protection against employment discrimination that they may have suffered.
After the Franklin opinion and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the same relief
314 1d. at 1020.
3' Id. at 704.
3161 d. at 705.
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is available to a plaintiff under Title VII as under Title IX. Neither title deters
proscribed conduct more than the other title; under either measure, discrimina-
tory employers will be forced to pay damages for their actions. Thus, recog-
nizing a private cause of action for employment discrimination under Title IX
does not effectuate Congress' goals. It also frustrates Congress' purpose in
repealing the Title VII exemption for educational employees. Under these
circumstances it is neither "necessary" or "sensible" to have an implied action
for employment discrimination under Title IX.
CONCLUSION
Increasingly, federal courts are faced with the conflict between Title
VII and Title IX in education employment situations. The trio of Supreme
Court cases interpreting Title IX seem to provide a straightforward answer.
However, there is no easy solution and these cases are misleading. As the
discussion of legislative intent and congressional purpose demonstrated, the
question of whether Title IX specifically implies a private right of action for
employment discrimination is different that the questions confronted in those
cases.
Because of the procedural distinctions between the two statutes, the
issue of Title VII's exclusivity is crucial. Plaintiffs using Title IX are allowed
to bypass the complete administrative configuration of Title VII and avoid the
objectives that configuration is meant to achieve. In Storey, the Wisconsin
District Court appreciated these difficulties and correctly held that a private
action for employment discrimination under Title IX cannot be available to
plaintiffs asserting a Title VII action. The Storey court reasoned that the
congressional intent which supported an implied cause of action under Title
IX generally did not exclude the possibility that Congress did not intend to
support an action for employment discrimination specifically. After examin-
ing the legislative record of Title IX, its relationship to Title VII, and the
purpose behind the private action recognized in Cannon, it is clear that courts
in the future should follow the Storey lead.
Douglas P. Ruth
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